At 01:38 AM 11/13/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote: >I wonder if this exchange misses the point. > >When these other organizations want, essentially, the services public >elections provide - then they properly join in EM.
I see the EM list as being about election methods, not about public elections or private elections specifically. Some of the discussion here does seem to presume that an election is for public office, but much is relevant both in the public and private arenas. >However, for most of them Robert's Rules has spent much effort doing well >what they need, and EM is not into their view of those topics. Election methods are a detail for Robert's Rules, which is mostly about deliberative procedure. When full deliberative process is possible, election methods become much less important; the rules of deliberation loom and decision loom much larger. >Corporations are off in their own corner - each share of stock owns a >vote, to be voted by its owner. I think that this may miss the point regarding corporate elections. Public elections would be similar to corporate elections if the state is considered as a corporation with each citizen owning one share. However, at common law, where an individual has a right, that right can ordinarily be exercised by an attorney-in-fact, otherwise in this context called a proxy. Were it not for legislation prohibiting it, proxy voting would be allowed in public elections. (In some countries voters who are unable to come to the polls may designate a proxy to vote for them, but this is not the same kind of voting as takes place in corporations.) The obstacle is the tradition of secret ballot, considered necessary to safeguard against coercion. However, it is my suspicion that the dangers of open voting in a society functioning with rule of law are drastically overstated, and, indeed, the use of secret ballot may allow more abuse than it prevents. In the corporate world, with huge asset values at stake (more than in many public elections), votes are a matter of record. And most votes are cast by proxy. (But the structures of corporate governance were developed when corporations were small in the sense of having relatively few shareholders. These shareholders were sophisticated and knew the situation with the various players and board candidates, or if they did not, they hired proxies who did. Modern corporations now have large numbers of essentially clueless shareholders who sign off on proxy solicitations sent by existing management. Delegable proxy is a solution to the problem of scale in corporate governance, just as it could be a solution to the problem of scale in democracy in general.) However, I'm not proposing delegable proxy for governmental bodies at the present time, not until there is sufficient experience with them to understand how they work in practice, not merely in theory. But there is plenty of work that can be done outside of government, and, in particular, in free associations, which are doubly protected against corruption and abuse. Free associations leave all the power in the hands of the members, they do not collect money, they have no authority to command obedience; their power consists solely of the power to communicate, to facilitate voluntary cooperation and coordination. That is quite enough power, if we but knew! ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
