Jan wrote: > So, it seems an Approval election can have NO equilibrium, and > obviously there will often be ONE equilibrium. Question: can > there be more than one equilibrium?
Yes, but I believe it requires sincere tied preferences. Given the sincere rankings 49:A>B=C 21:B>C>A 30:C>B>A there are two approval DSV strategy-A equilibria (which also turn out to be strong Nash equilibria): 49:A 21:B 30:CB 49:A 21:BC 30:C -- Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________________ Yahoo! DSL Something to write home about. Just $16.99/mo. or less. dsl.yahoo.com ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
