I didn't realize that you had to join the SSRN site to download the papers. You can also download the papers here" http://jeff.oneill.googlepages.com/home
Jeff On 2/25/06, Jeffrey O'Neill <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hello, > > I have three papers that may be of interest to members of this list. > I would appreciate any comments, and please send them to me off list. > PDF's can be downloaded from http://ssrn.com/author=367415 and > abstracts are listed below. > > best regards, > Jeff O'Neill > > > (1) When a Plurality is Good Enough, submitted to Public Choice > > This paper investigates when a runoff election is desirable and when a > plurality result is good enough. A runoff election increases the > likelihood that the Condorcet winner will be elected but also entails > additional costs. The metric for determining whether a runoff election > is desirable will be the probability that the winner of the plurality > election would win an ensuing runoff. Models of voter behavior are > developed that estimate this probability, which are verified with > runoff-election data from United States elections. The models allow > governments to make more informed choices in creating rules to decide > when to hold runoff elections. > > (2) Fast Algorithms for Counting Ranked Ballots, to appear in Voting Matters. > > With a number of voting systems, voters cast ballots by ranking the > candidates in order of preference. Voting systems that used ranked > ballots - e.g., the single transferable vote and Condorcet methods - > have theoretical advantages over simpler voting systems that do not > use ranked ballots, but are computationally more intensive. This > article shows that, by organinizing ballots into a tree data > structure, the computations can be decreased dramatically. For > example, with different versions of the single transferable vote, the > compuatation times will be decreased ten to twenty fold. > > (3) Everything that can be Counted Does not Necessarily Count: The > Right to Vote and the Choice of a Voting System, to appear in the > Michigan State Law Review > > This article investigates how the choice of a voting system impacts > the right to vote. It presents the first comprehensive summary of the > usage of alternative voting systems in the United States and also the > first comprehensive summary of the caselaw on voting systems. Two > aspects of the right to vote are considered: the right to an equally > effective vote and the right to a reliable electoral outcome. The > right to an equally effective of vote is considered as a > generalization and unification of disparate but related rights. The > only voting system that clearly violates this right is at-large > voting. Commentators have previously criticized the discriminatory > effects of at-large voting, but not in the last twenty years. This > article takes a fresh look at the legal viability of at-large voting > in light of the Supreme Court's more recent jurisprudence. The right > to a reliable electoral outcome is a heretofore undefined but > eminently reasonable right. If nothing else, the outcome of an > election must be meaningful in some sense. From a survey of the > Supreme Court's election law jurisprudence, notably the Anderson > balancing test, a middle-level review or reasonableness test is > proposed to regulate the right to a reliable outcome. This article > then applies this right to several voting systems, shows when they > would violate this right, and suggests possible remedies. > ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
