At 06:19 PM 2/28/2006, Jiri Räsänen wrote: >My last writing was too ambiguous, so I try to offer some adjustment. > >1. At this point I will not try to make any case >for or agains any system. I just want to clarify >what is meant for certain concepts, for myself >and hopefully in the process, to some other too.
My own intention is to foster discussion of the proxy and delegable proxy concepts. The more this is discussed, the more likely that these concepts will see application in real-world organizations. I'd also like to encourage anyone interested in delegable proxy to register (and confirm the registration checkmail that will come) at http://beyondpolitics.org/wiki even if you don't have time to do anything beyond that at the moment.... registration will give us a confirmed email address, a way to contact you. We don't plan to do regular mailings to the registration list, but it might be occasionally important. I think a regular discussion list will be started shortly. Actually, there is already a list, but it is not being publicized.... too much to do.... >There are a few possible terminology choises. I >tried to formulate that "direct representation" >would be a general attribute and "proxy >representation" being a sub set. If that doesn't >feel right, I'm OK with that too. In political science, here, they write about "direct democracy." A direct representative and a direct proxy are the same thing, if the representative has freedom of action. If the representative does not have freedom of action, you actually have direct democracy with the messages being carried by slaves. The term "proxy" in the U.S., in the business context, brings with it a series of expectations. Generally it is expected that the proxy in attendance at the annual meeting of a corporation does have the right of decision, as far as the corporation is concerned. The degree of freedom of the proxy may be defined in the relationship between the proxy and the one represented, but the actions of the proxy in the absence of the represented one are binding. That is, if the shareholder comes in after a vote and says, "But I instructed my proxy to do something else," the corporation officers will say, "Too bad. Maybe you should name someone else as a proxy next time." And this is as it should be. Except that an organization *might* provide for an extended voting period for members not present. I'm not sure I recommend it, but it is certainly possible. The intention would be that, in this period, members who don't agree with the action of their proxy may effectively revoke their proxy simply by voting directly. It is generally understood that a proxy acts in the absence or incapacity of the shareholder. If the shareholder shows up at the meeting after having named a proxy, the shareholder may participate directly and the proxy assignment is suspended. Share corporations, in their basic design, are direct democracies which allow proxy voting. So there exists centuries of experience, some of which would be useful in the design of peer organizations (i.e., in corporations where each "shareholder" has one share.) One obvious lesson: the hired servants of the corporation, specifically management, have a strong interest in the outcome of shareholder elections and other shareholder actions. In very large corporations, management, through various means, has effectively disenfranchised many or most of the shareholders, sometimes through rules that restrict shareholder participation and shareholder initiatives, other times simply through having the power to suggest, at corporate expense, that shareholders name X as a proxy, and, given the existence of many small shareholders who are basically clueless, these solicitations result, typically, in enough votes to maintain the dominance existing management and allow a lack of true oversight. Hence Enron. A simple solution to this would be for shareholders to be independently organized as a Free Association with Delegable Proxy. One of the functions of this organization, which would be extremely low-overhead, and either free or very cheap to join -- so cheap that it would be foolish for anyone with even a very few shares to not join -- would be to recommend proxy choices to members. As a Free Association, the organization itself would *not* endorse proxy candidates. Rather, it would foster communication about proxies, it might coordinate the hiring of professional proxies by shareholders (large institutional shareholders hire such companies to represent their interests. Nobody represents the small shareholders who, collectively, might actually own a majority of the stock. And a recommendation might come back to you from your proxy. It would probably be someone in the chain of delegable proxies to which the shareholder belongs, thus establishing a linkage of trust and open communication, should such be necessary, between the proxy and the shareholder. Free Associations with Delegable Proxy, I assert, could solve many, many problems that are almost intractable now, and they could do it without directly challenging or changing existing institutions. All it takes, really, is for a few shareholders of a corporation, for example, to realize that they could collectively advance their common interest much better than individually. They don't realize this because they are certainly unfamiliar, the vast majority of people are unfamiliar, with the possibilities of FA/DP organizations, which will avoid most of the major organizational pitfalls that are the reason why people don't already spontaneously organize unless things have gotten so bad that they are forced to.... >In my mind the most simple system is the D2000's >direct representation, that's why I pointed it >as a starting place. Delegated Proxy offers one layer more. Actually, another term for DP democracy is fractal democracy. It's not just a "layer" except in a technical sense; DP creates a fractal structure that potentially includes all the members and facilitates communication between them. When communication becomes easy, decision-making will likewise become much easier than it is now. Direct representation is simple, but it is also not scalable to the degree imagined. Direct representation is quite similar to basic proxy representation, and proxy representation is vulnerable to the same second-order scale problem as direct democracy; it merely postpones the problem until the group is larger (perhaps roughly the square of the maximum size that is functional with direct democracy.) But it is also my contention that delegable proxy will produce organizational benefits even in very small organizations. And it is much simpler to implement than most people think at first. >2. FCP'S MODEL AND THE EXPERIENCE PROMOTING IT > >I have been active in the FCP (Finnish Citizens' >Power) since its beginning at 1988. As far as I >have understood right the proper use of "proxy >representation", our proposed system was (is) not that, yet close to it. I don't see much, if any, difference. >FCP's Synthesis Democracy model: >1. The parliament functions via direct >representation. Rep A has 5000 votes and B 9000 votes etc. >2. There is a constant election, so that any >voter can change his/her representative at any given day. >(2.1 Changes would appear next morning, not minute-to-minute.) Proxy representation is changeable at any time, plus proxies are defacto revoked temporarily if the represented person actually votes. As you also have: >3. A citizen can reserve a vote that the >parliament is holding for him/herself. The >citizen's representative will remain, but in the >reserved issue will not use his/her vote. Exactly. The only difference with Delegable Proxy is that if a proxy is not present or does not vote, the vote of the proxy's proxy who *is* present and votes will include all the votes of those represented directly or indirectly. This is a matter of vote analysis after voting is closed, and there would presumably be thus an effective deadline for actually revoking a proxy for a pending result. But if there is a procedure for directly voting, it is simple to reverse the effect of a proxy's vote by directly voting, so the deadline is really, quite simply, the deadline for voting itself. I would stage voting so that there is a preliminary result which would be announced, giving time for members to directly vote if they care to. Note that in this period the proxies would be busy explaining to their "constituents" -- if it mattered to them -- why they voted as they voted. Somebody you trust would explain the pending decision to you. I think most people will take the advice, but they remain free not to. Again, note that you would be receiving, not the decision of the organization as advice, but your personal opinion of your personal and direct proxy, a person you chose presumably because you trust this person. This is why I call DP networks "networks of trust," and I talk about the organizations as being "trustworthy by design." People can certainly make mistakes as to whom to trust, but my opinion is that, on the average, people choose to trust people who are more trustworthy than they are themselves (in all ways, on the average), and if this is true, DP networks will select for trustworthiness and high levels will be highly trustworthy. >4. There is imperative mandate. Meaning that >after the representative has voted, a citizen >can take back the mandate in that single issue and vote him/herself. This seems quite the same as number 3 to me, though there may be a procedural distinction. >(4.1. Imperative mandate may take place only if >for example 1/10 of the representatives or 1/100 >of the electorate so addresses.) I'd make it general, if I understand it, but suspendable upon the agreement of a certain percentage of proxies, upon a declaration of emergency. It ought to be rare. (If my proxy agreed that something was an emergency and that therefore I would not have the right to review the vote and change it if I were not convinced, and I did not agree that, at least, there *was* an emergency, there would be a serious failure of trust, and I'd probably go looking for another proxy. Or, of course, directly participate, possibly holding proxies from others. >(5. Two possible treshold models for getting >elected to the parliament and dropping in the constant election) My own view is that assemblies will set their own rules. Given that all members, under standard parliamentary procedure, may vote on every issue before the whole, the members will restrict their own rights of participation voluntarily as needed for efficiency. In small organizations, restriction may be rare and confined to preventing damage from a deranged member. In larger organizations, though, participation rights must be limited. And, again, this follows closely the biological models I use. Proxies protect the center from the individual members and they protect the members from what could otherwise be overwhelming traffic from the center, given that most members will be busy with this or that. Synapses do exactly this. >Our argument was (is) quite like what Mr. Lomax presented. >Some favour representative democracy, some >favour direct democracy. We proposed that the >decision between direct and representative >democracy was not necessarily a monolithic >system-level decision. We propose a system that >allows each citizen decide wheter he/she wants >direct or representative democracy. Also >offering the flexibility to use DD in issues >close to me while letting RD handle the rest of >the stuff. Both alienation and the tyranny of the active could so be bypassed. Indeed. Mr. Räsänen, I want to congratulate you for bringing up the "tyranny of the active." I've written a fair amount on it, but haven't seen anyone else discussing it. Most active members of organizations don't see the damage that this can and does do. Indeed, what I've seen is that active members typically think that they are the ones who know what is best for everyone. *And they are often right.* But not always, and, what is worse, a majority of active members does not necessarily represent, absent proxy representation, a majority of all members. Organizations can be torn apart by the resulting incongruities. At best, a lot of time can be wasted. An example is something I've written about many times, an incident with our Town Meeting government. I'm fortunate to live in a small New England town that is governed by Town Meeting. Which is a direct democracy, a relic from earlier times, mostly abandoned as towns grew. Our town has about 800 registered voters with the right to attend the meeting and vote. Fortunately, only about twenty or thirty show up at the meeting! Or else nothing would get done! (All members have equal access to the floor, i.e., to speak and enter motions.) So Town Meeting approved a tax override to fund a new emergency services center. The Board of Selectmen, which is the closest thing the town has to a continual government, there is no mayor, also approved it. And a lot of money was spent on the planning. But Massachusetts law requires tax overrides to be presented directly to the voters. And it failed. Essentially, the active failed to convince the generality that their decision was right. This kind of thing would be rare in a DP organization. A DP organization would effectively consider the input of all the citizens who had any opinion at all, there would be a lot of back-and-forth, so that proposals which are actually submitted to the voters have already developed a serious consensus. The back-and-forth would exist in personal conversations, made possible by delegable proxy. That isn't possible, really, when proxies represent thousands of people. Students of democracy are quite aware of how representatives with substantial districts can't really consult their constituents, they must depend, rather, on polls or the like, or upon the opinions of those sufficiently motivated to contact them. Which will be skewed. >We printed our platform and hit the streets. Our >platform was all-in-one program to transform the >political system of Finland. Initially, most >thought we were crazy. Newspapers concentrated >our proposal of electronic voting. Let me suggest, gently, that attempt to reform the political system is going to run into what I've called the Lomax Effect, simply for lack of clear terminology and because I've not seen it described elsewhere, though it probably has been. This is related to the "tyranny of the active." When a structure is inequitable, providing excess power to some members of an organization, those members will resist change toward equity, because they will, correctly, see it as reducing their own power. Charitably, we may note that they will believe that this will be a transfer of power to the less knowledgeable, and often they will be right. But there is a way around the Lomax Effect, and that is to organize *outside* the existing structures, to form organizations whose basic function is to advise their members how to act *within* the existing structure. Ideally, these organizations should be structured and principled so as to attract *everyone* as members, there should be no reason other than pure inertia not to join, since joining the organization would never, unlike the norm, result in the fact of your membership being used against your interests or opinions. The organizations typically would not collect funds, thus you would not find that money you have contributed is used against what you wish, merely because a majority so decided. These are Free Association principles, well-developed by Alcoholics Anonymous and proven to work to develop and maintain organizational consensus where it matters. I think that FA/DP organizations will be so effective and efficient that, once formed, they will quickly come to dominate the political scene until a point will be reached where everyone who cares at all will have joined. And then you can with total ease drive the existing structures. You don't need to change laws and procedures. And you would develop great power long before that universal point is reached. There is a great deal of ink wasted on the alleged power of "special interest groups." The only reason special interest groups have excess power is that they are organized and the people, who, collectively, have *all* the power, are not organized. So how do you form a "special interest group of all the people." I submit that if you study this question, you will come up with FA/DP. >We did this campaigning for some 5 years hard. >After that we went on concentrating more >conservative reforms that would still enhance >pluralism. So we went to STV and such. Expected and proper, though, as you may imagine, I'd do it a little differently. That is, I would suggest that the organization never take a controversial position itself. Rather, caucuses within the organization would do this. In this way, there is a strong selection process created that would motivate people to find consensus through full discussion and deliberation. A caucus with a majority of voters in it does have the ability to go ahead and drive the existing system the way they want (and also more sophisticated systems such as STV). Actually, an even smaller caucus could do this under present conditions, if it is the largest caucus or has the most resources. But why be content with mere majority support, which, after all, steadily divides society. Why not seek consensus. Sure, absolute consensus in a very large group will probably be impossible, but there is no clear limit; mostly the failure to find substantial consensus results from not trying, not from its impossibility. >It refreshes my vains to see other people really >thinking much the same lines we have been thinking! I really think that anyone who approaches the existing situation, having certain ideas present with them, will come up with pretty much the same conclusions. It is just that most people never think about democracy and what it really means. FA/DP is a generic solution to the problem of human organization; FA guarantees that the organization cannot come to rule the members, and DP essentially creates a higher intelligence. It is the glimmerings of this higher intelligence that is the reason democracy in general, even the very primitive democracy that we have in the world today, is more successful than societies with more restricted oligarchies, and especially why it is more successful than dictatorships, which are limited by the intelligence of the dictator. Even a smart dictator is no match for millions of people working on problems and freely finding solutions. >3. As far as I know, Demoex is still running. As >far as I know, they haven't used Nordfors's technology. That's correct, as far as I know. But Demoex is quite limited, compared to what it could have been (and still could be). I'm not sure of the exact relationship with Nordfor, I think he was involved with the original Demoex technology, which may be why it did include delegable proxy. >4. Using cryptography, digital signature, it is >possible to have both secret ballot and a >communication between a representative (=proxy) >and a voter so that the representative knows >that the person who contacts him/her has voted for him/her. Sure, it is possible to conceal this information from all others, while at the same time validating that the vote has genuinely be transferred. Unfortunately, if the representative knows that so-and-so has voted for him or her, that representative could coerce the vote. Secret ballot must be secret from the ones who receive the votes, or it is not secret in one of the most important ways. In FAs with DP, secrecy becomes a fish bicycle, since the organization is not going to make any binding decisions. There will be so little profit in attempting to defraud the system that I seriously doubt that attempts would be at all common. The most that would happen if someone gathers a lot of phony proxies is that they could gain a voice in a high-level meeting, whereas otherwise they would only have a vote. And they would then have to convince a substantial number of the other high-level proxies, *real proxies, really trusted by a lot of people,* of the correctness of their cause. Unless the cause is truly worthwhile, this is going to be *very* difficult. And, remember, the resulting recommendation has to be filtered back down to the members *who hold all the actual power, such as the power to vote in public elections*, and it will subject to, essentially, universal scrutiny. All it takes is for one member to smell a rat and investigate. In FA/DP organizations, I presume that proxy assignments would *not* be secret. It would not be at all difficult to detect massive fraud. I think that those who might otherwise be tempted won't even bother. Too much risk for almost no gain. If you want to speak to a high-level meeting, all you have to do is to convince *one* full member of that meeting (i.e., with the right to directly address the assembly and to enter motions) that it should be done. This member would then either present your thoughts himself or herself, or would ask the permission of the assembly for you to address it. Easy. And if you can't get even one member to agree with you, surely, should you obtain the right to address it by fraudulent means, you would not get any further than that. And once the fraud was discovered, you might find yourself shunned. FAs don't punish members, period. But Free Association implies not only the freedom to associate, but the freedom *not* to associate. If you, for example, represent a large corporation which wants to be allowed to pollute, wouldn't you find it more fruitful to openly negotiate than to pursue a useless attempt to fool a very smart public? Perhaps the corporation will do something of sufficient value that it is worth the measure of pollution generated. Or, perhaps, the ideas being presented to the organization will result in even better ideas coming back, helping the corporation to develop plans that profit all. > - There are of course several critical issues in electronic voting! Electronic voting is really not difficult when it is only polling. And if you have a defined and validated membership list, electronic voting can be fraud-free. It is not the voting that it is difficult, it is the development of the membership list. DP provides a self-validating structure, with multiple pathways of communication, including non-electronic and personal, direct meetings. >5. To me, there is a problem of delegable proxy >having more than one level of voting / >delegating. Quite amusingly, the cycle may >occure: A wants to give his vote to B. B wants >to give his vote to C and C wants to give his >vote to A. Of course it is possible just to >prohibit cyclic delegating, but this does not >make the problem disappear, it merely transforms >it. There is more to it but I will not go deeper on the issue at the moment. You should understand that this objection (what I call proxy loops) is common among those who encounter the idea and actually give it some thought. (Most people don't get that far.) Some consider it a serious problem. I don't, because, first of all, loops should be routine. That is, I would encourage everyone in the organization, *everyone*, to name a proxy. I.e., even if there is a superproxy, someone who directly or indirectly represents everyone in the organization, this person would name a proxy. Which will obviously create a loop. There will be factions in the organization, I expect, and each faction will create a loop. Yes, if there are *very* many factions, there could theoretically be a serious representation failure if the individual factions were not large enough to qualify. Of course, qualifications would be adjusted to that situation; but this is the generic and simple solution: Whenever small loops are created in the assignment list, the members of the loop are notified. If *any* member of the loop changes his or her assignment outside the loop, the loop becomes connected. In a small organization, if A wants to name B and B wants to name A, the smallest possible loop, what is the problem if, always, A or B attend the meetings. If the organization is larger and such a small loop would not have full participation privileges, then, of course, A and B would be motivated to seek and find someone else to represent them both in the absence of both of them. Yes, it would be possible to prohibit loops, but, as I've established, I think, they are necessary and inevitable. They only would cause harm under certain conditions, easily prevented. If A and B really don't care to be represented, why should the organization care? Sure, it wants to encourage everyone to join, but everyone is *not* going to join, and the A-B loop described is *almost* like not joining, if it is a large organization. By closing their trust upon each other, by failing to seek and find someone to trust outside their very limited circle, they have disenfranchised themselves. And consider how this compares to the situation now. It certainly is not worse! Without delegable proxy, in any case, there will be a much more common representation failure. After all, what if the proxy is absent? >6. Funny that you mentioned the Chinese society. >I remember that Nordfors was thinking that >perhaps the communist party could use the system for internal discussion. Yes. Now, the existing party has its Lomax Effect. It's not likely to happen there. But there are independent NGOs in China which are able to walk the tightrope, particularly I am aware of environmental organizations, which have been able to expose the graft and corruption involved in companies polluting Chinese resources. Really, though, the FA/DP organizations could be about *any* subject. It really does not matter, in the long run, what matters is that people discover that there is a way to create a powerful organization overnight, once the mechanisms are understood. Consider a phone tree where everyone in the tree calls N people. N can be very small and still all will be called within a fairly small period of time, the power of exponential growth. > I tried to sell the system to a major party in > Finland, their key person in the internal > forums (now the prime minister of Finland, BTW) > was interested but they had already invested > into a different web discussion system. Let me tell, you, the Lomax Effect. It happens in large and small organizations. I did not make this up! (If anyone wants to come up with a better name, they are welcome. "Persistence of Inequity Effect?" >7. To my mind the most proponent places to start >the silent revolution of Delegable proxies could >be mis-sized parties and unions, where there is >both formal and informal discussion, both paid >and non-paid people. You see, if you have a >discussion + delegative system out in the wild, >there is no real reason for people to join it, >since there is nothing close to decide, it's just talk. Talk is much more powerful than one might think. After all, "talk" can be, properly organized, "deliberation," the foundation of real and functional democracy. "Mere talk" usually is what takes place when there are no structures, no decision-making mechanisms, such as Robert's Rules or other parliamentary rules. I tried to introduce Robert's Rules to the Range Voting list, which wants to be an organization, and it was shot down. And the result, I can rather confidently predict, is that these very smart and very good people will continue to spin their wheels with minimal actual impact. My attempt to introduce the Rules was misunderstood as an attempt to control the organization, and the scrupulousness with which I guaranteed the full rights and powers of all participants, as acting chair, functioning only for the purpose of making the proposal and making a decision on it, was seen as wasting time, since, with an online discussion group, it is necessary to wait quite a while before actually proceeding to a binding vote. However, my only agenda was the process itself, and I actually don't want to be running a specific-cause organization, I was merely offering my services and experience temporarily. I'm a bit like a very primitive organism that sows thousands of seeds, needing only one of them to germinate and sprout. When there are more involved, working with me or I with them -- or, preferably, both -- we will start to see much more happening. For now, I can say that I have stimulated, here, consideration of delegable proxy as a viable possibility, and there are election methods implications, among them Asset Voting, which is basically delegable proxy used for the purpose of creating a peer assembly, generally with no wasted votes. Everyone ends up with an elected representative for whom they voted, or who passed on their vote to a winner. Asset Voting would fit into many existing structures, and it would be quite simple to implement. Asset Voting is an invention of Warren Smith, the Range Voting activist, and I don't think he has realized the power of what he invented. Range Voting is excellent for polling, but it would be a disaster, I think, for creating an assembly with proportional representation. It is still a voting method, essentially, with winners and losers. And, necessarily, wasted votes, votes where the voter might as well have stayed home, his or her vote had no effect on the outcome. There is a form of Asset Voting, I call FAAV, Fractional Approval Asset Voting, which takes a standard ballot and simply divides the votes cast on it among the candidates who receive those votes. You can vote for one and that person gets one vote. Or you can vote for ten and create a virtual committee which will ultimately decide how to distribute your vote. Essentially, you vote for the person or persons you trust. It is actually delegable proxy in disguise, and might very well function that way in the negotiation process that ensues after the election. > Political systems coded in law are, on the > other hand, way too resistant to change to be a > starting point. In small units it may be the > easiest to begin such a system, but it takes at > least a mid-sized party before the delegated > discussion / voting will begin to have > distinctive emergent properties that aside of > discussion list type organization. It may be easier to change the law than to change existing power relationships. The Lomax Effect functions even in purely voluntary nonprofits. In fact, it can sometimes be worse there than in profit-making organizations or in government. People in nonprofits are often quite convinced that they are working for a good cause, which justifies whatever underhanded techniques they use to get what they think is best, which, surprise, often means that their personal power is enhanced or at least maintained. But even without that "ends justify the means" problem, inequities persist. >8.1 The smallest step towards the Delegated >proxy democracy in present western democracies: >When there is a referendum and let's say 60% of >the people vote, let the parliament use the >remaining 40% of the total voting power. Interesting. However, I think the whole thing is unnecessary. I'm no longer exercised to change existing structures. Tackled directly, it can be very, very difficult. Snowball's chance in Hell of getting the excellent idea just mentioned implemented, unless preconditions exist. I'm working on the preconditions, which is that the people become directly organized, *outside* of power structures. *Then* the power structures can be managed, and if they need to be changed, it can easily happen. >This way there is no fear that too little people >would vote in a referendum for it to be >meaningful, since the representatives would >always fill the remaining political vacuum. >Meaning that you could have much more referendums. >This could be an easy step for present Switzerland. Sure. Watch. You won't be able to do it unless you first develop a consensus, or something quite large. Existing organizations require much more than a good idea. This, in fact, was one of the original impulses behind my design of DP; it was to form a way to consider ideas that would rapidly develop a response and, if warranted, action. If there had been, for example, an FA/DP organization of U.S. F.B.I. agents, 9-11 would not have happened. The information was there but the top-down organization of the F.B.I. could not process it. FA/DP is organized bottom-up. Indeed, it would work excellently *alongside* a top-down organization, it not only need not oppose or replace it, rather it will complement it and bring in the missing element that will make the combination fully intelligent. [...] >So, to summarize: There could be at least two >meaningful routes to delegated proxy. One being >the small and mid-scale parties and >associations. The other could be to adjust >referendums close to proxy logic and step by step having more referendums. I think that there is no way to predict what route it will take, but it is far too good an idea to *never* see the light of day, and it is far too simple. It essentially costs nothing but the creation of a list. That list can be a wiki page with a list of members and assigned proxies. You want to change your assignment, log in and change your listing. Some people thinking about this want to have multiple proxies. I do suggest multiple proxies for multiple organizations, but within a single organization, there are quite a few reasons why naming one and only one proxy will be, I expect, far more powerful. Most of all, there is a clear and defined responsibility. I've seen what happens when two people represent something. Each one of them thinks that the other is going to do it. Single-assignment DP, with small loops voluntarily broken, provides a clear chain of communication, defined from both ends, each link in the chain representing a relationship of trust. That trust can be provisional, the member can scrutinize all the actions of the proxy and question them if necessary, but the point is to build those relationships. You don't want a proxy who will be too busy to return your phone call or your email. Yes, a high-level proxy, or even one not so high-level, may have a mailing list to communicate with those represented, but it is communication in the other direction that must be personal and usually initiated from the bottom. >9. Too bad what happened with Approval voting group. :-( Nah.... *expected.* If it is too bad, it is too bad for the Approval Voting cause, but that cause is not going to fail solely based on what happened to me; *however*, what happened to me betrayed the utter lack of understanding and political sophistication on the part of those who founded and control the group and the list. In this they are not untypical of would-be reformers of democracy who actually do not trust democracy and prefer to create oligarchical structures that they can personally control. Read the proposed bylaws of Citizens for Approval Voting.... they specifically prohibit proxy voting. Guess why! (These rules are common, they may have copied them from some other organization, but the prohibition was originally created to prevent members from actually exerting the control that they theoretically have.) I think I drove the moderator up the wall by recommending to him exactly how he could do what he wanted to do -- stop me from discussing what he thought was irrelevant, *if* his action had the support of the list -- and I don't think he realized that he was talking to forty years of organizational experience. I know how to shut up a rogue member of a group *without* being a tyrant, and, quite possibly, without gratuitously alienating the individual. Who, after all, may have a lot of useful energy to donate. I write a lot, but I *do* have a lot to say, and not enough time at the moment to edit it down. Perhaps I'll do that when I write the book. Or perhaps, as is more common, it will be edited by someone else. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
