Dear Abd ul-Rahman! To begin with: It might be the case that what you wrote contains the answer to what I will ask, but the sheer amount of your postings makes it completely impossible to read them in my 15 minutes a day I can afford...
Here's the main problem I see when using non-secret proxy systems: If X can prove to Y that she named Y as her proxy, then people can buy votes: Y can give X money for naming her as proxy. This would result in a plutocracy instead of a democracy. Yours, Jobst Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: > At 05:17 AM 3/3/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote: > >>My topic is a legislature, which represents all the voters in the >>district. They appoint via proxy, rather than electing, members of the >>legislature, such as a senate. >> >>Responding to Jobst: >> >>Y must know if X is Y's proxy, to be able to judge whether it is time to >>switch proxies. > > > Actually, if Y does not know the identity of his or her proxy, that > person is not a proxy, as we have been using the term. A proxy is a > personally chosen representative, as distinct from an assigned or elected one. > > [For secrecy] > >>Others would do elections. Seems they can get secrecy. They also lose >>ability to redo proxies until the next election. Finally, the multilevel >>proxies with opportunity for communication look good to me - but hard to >>set up via election. > > > Secret-Ballot Delegable proxy, like the initial Asset Voting > proposal, would be secret in the initial assignment of proxies, but > open in the subsequent assignments. Rather obviously, for there to be > responsible government, *somewhere* the identity of the > representatives must become known. Delegable proxy can boil down > representation until it reaches a manageable and efficient assembly, > and I think we assume that the members of the assembly must be public > figures. There seems to be little harm in what is public being larger > than the assembly, and, indeed, it could be much larger. > > Secret Ballot, in my opinion, is only necessary under conditions > where there is reasonably possibility of voter coercion or > intimidation. When a proxy represents a certain minimum number of > voters, it becomes possible to devote public resources to the > protection of these proxies, just as public representatives are now > protected. In any case, no citizen would be forced to serve as a > proxy who was not willing to take the risk involved. I do not think > there is any way to protect through secrecy any level in a delegable > proxy system higher than the primary assignment of proxies. Thus > secret ballot proxy systems would probably lose, to some degree, one > major advantage of delegable proxy: its ability to create efficient > and manageable *personal* communication between the public as a whole > and those who represent the public, made possible by a totally free > assignment of proxies, even to the point where a proxy may only hold > one vote other than his or her own. (But more commonly might hold, > say, twenty, a very manageable communications burden for unpaid volunteers.) > > >>Seems like time for debate. > > > What we need is discussion, and we need something else. In the FAQ > which is being written (and posted piecemeal here), it will become > clear that FA/DP organizations are not merely communication fora, but > that they also have decision-making mechanisms, or, more accurately, > mechanisms for developing and measuring consensus, since FAs, except > with regard to simple organizational business, don't really make decisions. > > My goal is to see a much wider understanding of Delegable Proxy (and > what I think is an inevitable precursor, at least, Free Association > Delegable Proxy. If government were a Free Association, it would be, > essentially, libertarian, but I'm not a Libertarian nor is Delegable > Proxy Libertarian, in the sense of advocating libertarian government > (which may be an oxymoron). I'm convinced that libertarian principles > are appropriate for Free Associations, but am far from convinced that > they would work in government, and certainly not now, if ever. > > However, where freedom of thought and discussion is important, the > mechanism which facilitates discussion must be free of coercion, > hence libertarian. > > >>Do not understand your statement about forcing. Partly because the record >>keeping should prevent loops. > > > Actually, all that is necessary is that loop members know that they > are in a loop. If every member of an organization names a proxy, > loops are inevitable. The only problem is where a loop ends up > unrepresented in a discussion or poll because *no* member of the loop > participates. Loops are one of the first problems that people think > of when they actually start to consider the implications, but they > are not really a problem, particularly if members of loops are > notified, which may be automatic whenever a loop is formed (assuming > some kind of automated system), or which could simply be a > notification when all loop members are "absent" from a "meeting" or poll. > > >>Some thoughts on design for a senate, etc. (here voters do proxies >>instead of elections and, as I describe it, can amend their proxies >>whenever they see need): > > > I.e., this is not a secret-ballot system > > > >>Need to maintain a current list of voters. New ones register; old ones >>die; some move into a district; some move out. >> A district must appoint (rather than elect) multiple senators - >>likely one district to appoint the complete senate. > > > The original thinking that led to my own formulation of delegable > proxy went through a stage where the idea was that voters would meet > in small groups and elect one of their number to represent them to > another small group composed of those similarly elected, etc. The > initial idea was to hold a Presidential election in 10 days, starting > from scratch, where every "round" in this election involved > face-to-face meetings of perhaps 10 people. The first and most > obvious problem was in this election of a single representative. > Though there is a possible solution, the meetings could be > essentially preselected for strong affinity, I eventually came to the > idea that a meeting could send on more than one representative, and > then, even simpler, that people could assign proxies; the structure > becomes chaotic, a fractal, which at first seemed a disadvantage > until I realized that nervous systems are organized as fractals. It > may be hard to visualize, but it would be self-organizing, like > biological structures, and the functioning would be relatively simple. > > Forcing proxies to be assigned within districts may not be harmful > when the districts are large, but I don't see any reason for it > except where the district is the district of the entire assembly, > i.e., is its jurisdication. What if the person I most trust in the > world lives across town, in a different precinct. Why should I not be > able to give my proxy to him, to represent me in the city council? > > Indeed, my most active current project is for a Parent Free > Association at a private school. The Parent Council currently > consists of Class Representatives, which are theoretically elected by > class. It's an obvious way to do it, but the fact is that Parent > Council at this school and at other affiliated schools are famous for > passing in and out of existence every few years. Class representation > is *very* spotty. Many parents don't even know who their class rep > is, for they did not attend the meeting where the rep was elected. > Communication is quite poor. > > Class reps are like district representatives with a small district. > You may or many not have *anyone* in the class with whom you have > good rapport, and good rapport is an essential element in building a > strong organization. > > It is not that class representation is wrong, it is just that it is > neither complete nor necessarily efficient. What I'm proposing is > that parents be encouraged to name a *personal* representative, on a > public list, someone they would most trust to represent them and to > inform them of what they might need to know of Parent Council > activities, if they are not themselves present. > > >>Any voter offering to be a proxy holder needs to offer a "platform" to >>identify what kind of action they offer. > > > This is political thinking, and it really assumes quite a gap between > proxies and those they represent. Delegable Proxy opens the > possibility for choosing on the basis of something much better than > platform, which is all too often something that a politician tells > you he supports in order to get you to vote for him, and *maybe* he > will follow it. And maybe we are all better off if he does not, for > politicians will promise the moon. > > I'd suggest, instead, choosing proxies based on a simple > characteristic: you trust the person. And, more than that, you have > access to the person. This is why, once people realize what a proxy > is, they would no more choose Clint Eastwood as their proxy than they > would choose him to handle their affairs when they were on vacation > or incapacitated; i.e., only if he was actually a personal friend and > available for the task. > > It is this possibility of easy access that is what sets delegable > proxy apart from all other representational systems that I've been > able to imagine. > > And, I'm sure, that is why biological systems are organized in a > similar way. You don't have one neuron linked to a million sensors. > > >> Both lone voters, and those who already hold proxies, can offer >>their collection to this holder. > > > I'd never do it without a personal conversation. > > Many people, presented today with such a system for public > governance, would not know what to do. Fortunately, proxy democracy > will almost certainly see broad adoption in non-governmental > organizations, so, by the time it hits public life, they will know what to do. > > This aspect of the discussion is largely moot: if a proxy system is > set up, proxies and the public will do what they will do, the rules > would not state anything, I'm sure, about public statements of > platform. Personally, were I willing to serve as a proxy, I would > *not* issue a platform. Platforms are either useless fluff intended > to attract votes, or they actually bind a sincere politician who > wants to do what he promised and who therefore is inflexible when > faced with information which would lead him to something contrary. > > Platforms and the debate around them are useful under present > conditions because they *can* give us a glimpse into the character of > those who debate them, and some idea of how these people might > function. But, we might note, politicians often disappoint, perhaps > more often than not, when measured against their platforms. > > With DP, sure, you can change your proxy at any time, but this also > makes platform not nearly as important. Indeed, if what we are > talking about is direct democracy with delegable proxy, i.e., > citizens may vote directly on any issue if they so choose, and > especially if citizens may see how their proxy voted and remove their > vote from his by directly casting a vote, platform becomes *much* > less important. What matters much more is that the proxy serves well > as a communicator and analyst. > > >> Note that there are many possible platforms - positions with few >>backers end up with no one both offering a platform AND getting enough >>proxies to get seated in the senate (access to abortion easier or harder >>and access to drugs easier or harder are reasons for 4 platforms for the >>4 basic combinations on these two issues). > > > In a DP system as I foresee it, there would be multiple ways to be > heard in a "Senate." The proxy system does three things: it allows > decisions to be made without the direct participation of the voter, > which is especially valuable when the voter has no opportunity or > inclination to become properly informed; it is a means whereby > citizen concerns can be communicated to the assembly of the whole; > and it is a means whereby the whole can communicate and explain > decisions to the citizens. > > However, suppose the citizen has a critical concern and the citizen's > trusted proxy, on that particular issue, refuses to carry the concern > to the assembly. If this causes the citizen to lose trust in the > proxy, then the remedy is simple: change the proxy assignment. But > what if this is a simple disagreement and the citizen does not > consider that it renders the proxy otherwise untrustworthy? There is > nothing to prevent the citizen from approaching any other person with > the concern, and if this person is willing to pass it up, this person > passes it (and explains it) to *her* proxy. > > The fractal structure of DP, if the organizational habits are right, > allows personal communication to become general communication. While > some might worry about the "telephone game" problem, the loss of > information in transmission, that problem only exists when there is > no parallel redundancy, such as written communication passed up -- or > group edited on a wiki. > > >> Perhaps this holder offers communication with those voters whose >>proxies are held directly. > > > It think that is essential. Sure "distant" DP might be a vast > improvement over elected representation, but it will be a pale > imitation of what it might be if communication is open. > > (It is for this reason that I've considered that proxies would not be > effective until *accepted*. A proxy who is too busy to accept another > "client" might suggest one of his existing clients to the > applicant.... This is very different from what we see in the > political sphere, where we expect politicians to seek us and to sell > us on voting for them. That, indeed, is a formula for creating all > the mess we see today.... When a corporation wants to hire an > executive, they search for him or her, and I think they might be very > suspicious of someone who spent millions of dollars to get them to > hire a particular candidate. After all, if I want to pay *you* to > allow me to handle your affairs, what would you think?) > > >> If so, there almost HAS to be a limit as to >>how many voters this offer extends to - not necessarily all voters whose >>proxies are held. > > > The offer can and should extent to all givers of *direct* proxies. > Not to indirect. Those who have named a lower level proxy communicate > with the higher level through their lower level proxy, the one whom they > chose. > > *However,* I do expect some broader communication than that. A > high-level proxy might, for example, operate a mailing list for all > of those represented, and this list might extend and include those at > lower levels. > > Where a high-level proxy represents *many* people, such as millions, > that list could not be unmoderated. But proxies will work all this > out themselves, it does not at all have to be part of the structural > rules. The structural rules, in fact, can and should be *very* simple. > > >>Secrecy of proxies: NEEDS to be doable, yet parts of my proposal require >>openness. > > > Secrecy is doable at the primary level and even there it does inhibit > realizing the full value of the system. > > >>The senate needs rules. Some should be standard - likely based on >>Robert's Rules. Some need to be tailorable - some easier than others. >>Basic coding I use below: >> E - easy to modify, for little problem with manipulating. >> H - hard to modify, where there can be excessive temptation to >>modify for wrong reasons. >> HH - REALLY dangerous to change. >> >>Size of senate: >> E - to increase - when present membership sees value in letting in >>other viewpoints, and that bigger is practical. >> H - to decrease - can be temptation to lock out annoying members >>holding few proxies. > > > The problem is not as difficult as it might seem, *if* voting in the > senate remains completely open, i.e., if it is a direct democracy > with respect to voting, if not with respect to generating universal > traffic (i.e., speaking to or entering motions before the whole > assembly). The rules are subject to vote as in Robert's Rules; the > rules restricting *full* membership actually benefit everyone, so > there should be no problem in getting the membership to accept them. > After all, Town Meeting governments devolve into City Councils, > resulting in a loss of citizen power, because citizens realize what a > pain it is to deal with tedious meetings. As long as the rules > changes, and any decision at all, really, must receive the approval > of the required majority of all who vote, personally or by proxy, > there is no problem with restricting full membership. It will be > self-regulating. > > (If for some reason membership is restricted too far, a majority of > those speaking before the assembly might be promoting a certain > agenda, yet the agenda would fail to receive majority approval. In > order to get majority approval, you need to allow broad participation.) > > >>Puzzle: Size of senate has to be kept practical. Yet potential number of >>platforms approaches number of voters. My best thought is that the small >>parties have to develop a platform that enough of them can share to have e >>holder of enough proxies to get on the floor of the senate. > > > Again, I think platform secondary to character. It is quite possible > for a representative of character to fairly represent the views of > people with whom she disagrees. > > DP, by the way, makes political parties rather unnecessary. I'm not > sure they would continue. They would not be needed to fund elections, > because there would be no elections as we understand them. Everyone > who wants to be is represented, there is no need -- or means -- to > "beat" the other party. Rather, controversy will devolve into issue > controversy rather than platform, party controversy. > > >> Size of senate has to be kept manageable. >> Do not see a voter having a voice or vote except via a holder with >>enough proxies to qualify for a seat. > > > Exactly. The exact number I would leave to the vote of the assembly, > assuming that this is a *full* vote, not merely the vote of the members. > > (I've assumed, generally, direct democracy, membership restrictions > are only about those things which must be restricted to avoid > communications overload, i.e., addressing the whole and entering > motions. It is these things which require either the action of a > qualified proxy or the permission of the assembly (presumably upon > the motion of a qualified proxy). > > >>[...] >>Puzzle: Power of individual senators has to be limited. If one senate >>held and voted a majority of the proxies, that senator would have a >>monopoly on voting. Make the limit a percentage of votable proxies >>votable by one senator: >> H - to make limit over 25% or under 10% (my offer). Over 25% >>encourages concentrating voting power too close to a monopoly; under 10% >>discourages reasonable concentrations. >> E - to vary limit between those points. > > > I've thought about this. The problem is moot in Free Associations, > but it could be a serious one in government. However, if votes are > held in stages, where all qualified proxies cast their votes first, > and then there is a period in which those not qualified (on down to > individual citizens) may cast their vote independently, the problem > disappears. There is no power problem even if there is a superproxy > (which might be defined as one who represents everyone, or, perhaps > more usefully, as above, i.e., one who represents a majority of votes > and thus theoretically able to make decisions directly. But only if > those represented continue to consent!) > > So I don't recommend a limit. *As long as the proxies are revocable > at any time and as long as direct voting by a citizen (or lower level > proxy) removes that citizen's vote from the high-level proxy's total.* > > >>Write-in votes? I sympathize but, when I try to think farther my head >>aches. > > > Fractals do that to ya. > > Fortunately, we can try all this out in NGOs, including discussion > and advocacy groups, where failure will not cause serious harm. > > >> I do say that a voter can retract his proxy, but this leaves him >>mute until s/he finds a more acceptable platform to back (this voter can >>even do a new platform, but remains mute until attracting enough proxies >>to demand a seat). > > > This problem only exists if direct voting is not allowed. I see no > reason to prohibit it, and plenty of reason to facilitate it. You > visit the Senate, and a motion is being considered about which you > have an opinion. Perhaps you listen to the debate. And when it comes > time to vote, you go to a terminal which is set up for members of the > public to vote. You enter some identifying information and a > password, and you cast your vote. And that vote is recorded and, > indeed, reported. Imagine this: The vote in the Senate today on the > bill to establish a fund for the support of frumindillys passed today > by a vote of 603,507,276 to 1, the only dissenter being Mr. Contrary > from Hokokomo. > > And when it turns out that frumindillys are really bad for the > environment, won't Mr. Contary look good? > > Seriously, the vast majority of votes cast in the Senate, even if > remote voting is allowed (i.e., internet voting), will be cast by > proxies, and probably most of them by qualified proxies, i.e., those > with debate rights. But the very fact that everyone can vote if they > so choose solves the problem of exclusion. There is very little harm > in excluding some from debate if they are *not* simultaneously > excluded from the decisions themselves. > > Today, we are both excluded from debate, the vast majority of us, but > also from decision. The former is necessary, but the realization that > decision and debate could be separated has been one of my better moments.... > > ---- > election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
