Hi,
Just passing through.
--- Antonio Oneala <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> This method seems to satisfy the Strong FBC, because your vote will not
> go to the second choice unless your candidate has absolutely no chance of
> winning.
To satisfy strong FBC, it would have to be the case that by changing your
vote from
A>B>C
to
B>A>C,
you could not move the win from C to B, for example.
> It also passes the participation criterion,
I have to disagree with this. Your showing up to vote can affect the
rounds'
winners in an arbitrary way.
> It would satisfy the
> majority
> criterion if you didn't allow people to rank as many people 1st place as
> they wanted, but I really don't see how limiting voter choice is going to
> improve the method too much.
You don't have to do that. Majority criterion usually refers to a
majority's
strict first preference.
> From what I can tell from it, it ALMOST
> satisfies Arrow's Impossibility theorom, except that it is not fully
> deterministic because it makes a lot of assumptions about voter strategy.
I don't understand this. How do you satisfy Arrow's impossibility theorem?
This method is more like Bucklin than IRV. ER-Bucklin(whole) satisfies
weak FBC. I don't know of a deterministic method that satisfies strong FBC.
Kevin Venzke
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