Hi,
Forest S wrote:
> Steve E. wrote:
>-snip-
>> Now... can we please go back to discussing whether candidates would have
>> sufficiently
>> strong incentives to rank compromise candidates over worse candidates, when
>> publishing their orderings before election day, assuming the voting method I
>> repeated
>> above?
>
> Yes! In your scenario of
> 35M Bush>McCain>Gore
> 20M McCain>Bush>Gore
> 45M Gore>McCain>Bush
>
> Suppose Rove saw this coming, and not relying completely on slandering McCain
> this
> time, decided to publish the Bush ranking as
>
> Bush>Gore>McCain
>
> Wouldn't it be to McCain's advantage to fail to rank the other two candidates?
Perhaps. McCain looks like the sincere Condorcet winner here. (I believe he
was the
sincere Condorcet winner in 2000, by the way.) Some voting methods satisfy the
Minimal
Defense criterion, in which the supporters of the sincere Condorcet winner can
induce an
equilibrium that elects him/her by omitting less preferred candidates from
their
orderings. (MAM satisfies Minimal Defense.) There's an obvious analogy; in
this example
the ordering published by the sincere Condorcet winner omits the less preferred
candidates. I don't believe this behavior by a sincere Condorcet winner would
be a
problem. My question was more specifically whether there would be sufficiently
strong
incentives for Gore to choose to rank McCain over Bush, even though McCain is
not a member
of Gore's party. If candidates will behave that way, then this simple voting
method is
quite worthy of promotion.
I specified a tallying method I hoped would be considered first when
considering the
example: allowing candidates to withdraw after the votes are cast and then
counting each
ordering for its topmost non-withdrawn candidate. (In other words, Plurality
Rule.) Of
course, you're all free to discuss any tallying method you please.
Although the Gore/McCain/Bush example uses the names of candidates from a
recent
Presidential election, I didn't write that they're running for President. My
purpose in
using those names was because I expected the readers would be familiar with
their party
affiliations and the voters' relative preferences about them in 2000, not
because I expect
we can reform the voting method used in Presidential elections any time soon.
Reforming
less important elections must come first, to demonstrate to the public the
desirability of
the new method(s). (This is another reason why I consider our recent discussion
of the
Electoral College to have gotten us temporarily off track.) I'm wondering now
if it would
have been more helpful if I'd chosen an example without recognizable names,
such as the
following:
Three candidates R1, R2 and D competing for a seat in
some state's Senate or Assembly.
The voters' top choices:
35% prefer R1.
20% prefer R2.
45% prefer D.
The candidates' sincere preference orders:
R1: R1 > R2 > D
R2: R2 > R1 > D
D: D > R2 > R1
Assume that nearly all of the 35% who prefer R1 also
prefer R2 over D, and that nearly all of the 45% who
prefer D also prefer R2 over R1. The 20% who prefer
R2 are divided about who is second best, with most
of them preferring R1 over D.
Will D publish the ordering D > R2 > R1?
As a variation, assume the R party nominated R1 but not R2, and then R2 chose
to continue
competing as an independent candidate. R2 need not worry about being a spoiler
if s/he
publishes the ordering R2>R1>D, since if necessary s/he can withdraw after the
voting. By
running s/he'd most likely increase the voter turnout, making it harder for D
to win.
When considering this variation, we would also want to consider the cases where
R1's
sincere preference ordering is R1 > R2=D or R1 > D > R2.
Regards,
Steve
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