At 01:57 AM 6/8/2006, Dave Ketchum wrote: >I choke on your collection of methods: > >Imposing both range and ranked choice demands that the voter consider both >methods. It also complicates the ballot and the counting.
Ranked information can be extracted from a Range ballot. If someone doesn't want to equate two candidates, they don't give them the same range rating.... Simple. (If a voter considers two candidates equal, within the resolution of the Range ballot, it is questionable to base a public election on preference between them; indeed, is this not the very reason to go to Range, to avoid forcing preference (but ranked ballots that allow equal ranking do avoid that). >No point to having both IRV and Condorcet: > Usually they will select the same winner. The difference is not in the ballot, but only in the analysis. I can see a benefit to publishing both analyses. The IRV winner is perhaps simpler to explain and, as you've pointed out, usually IRV will select the same winner. But, especially in a close election, it would not be too hard to explain why a Condorcet failure in an IRV election should result in the victory going to the Condorcet winner. Condorcet should be the rule, IRV merely a way of explaining the results. (But actually, Condorcet is *easy* to explain: The winner is the candidate who would beat all other candidates in a two-person race, based on the rankings on the ballot.) ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
