At 2:18 PM -0600 6/13/06, Jan Kok wrote: >One bit of help I could use: Is anyone familiar with the article Rob >mentions in this paragraph? > >> Jack Nagel, a UPenn professor, has an important new article out >>this year called "Burr's Dilemma" that goes into how this flaw >>played out in the 1796 and 1800 presidential election, where the >>presidential electors (who at that time had two equally weighted >>votes), made strategic mistakes with major consequences in both >>elections. Nagel used to say approval voting was better, but now >>says IRV is better.
The key slide from Nagel's presentation: Statement of the Burr Dilemma When three or more candidates compete for an office that only one can win, and voters (V) may support two (or more) of them by casting equal (approval) votes, candidates (C1 and C2) seeking support from the same group (G) of voters will maximize their respective votes if all members of G vote for both C1 and C2. Both candidates thus have an incentive to appeal for shared support. However, if such appeals succeed completely and neither candidate receives votes from members of V-G, the outcome will be at best a tie in which neither C1 nor C2 is assured of victory. Each candidate therefore has an incentive to encourage some members of G to vote only for himself or herself. If both C1 and C2 successfully follow such a strategy, either or both may receive fewer votes than some other candidate C3 supported by members of V-G. The risk that both C1 and C2 will lose is exacerbated if a retaliatory spiral increases the number of single votes cast by members of G. At the limit, such retribution reduces approval voting to conventional single-vote balloting among the members of G or, if the problem is endemic, among all voters. The nearer that limit is approached, the lower the probability that advantages claimed for approval voting will be realized.. -- /Jonathan Lundell. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
