Anthony O'Neal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> write: > And about the proportional range system I talked about earlier, the workings > of the system is obvious. Under PAV rules, you assume that candidates give 1 > point to an outcome for having one approved of candidate, 1/3 for the second > approved of candidate, 1/5 for the third, and so on, and so on.
There are tactical issues with this method. It is in your interests to not vote for someone who is already going to be elected. It is also in the interests of a party to try to "vote manage". If they can evenly split their vote, then they can get more candidates. One of the big benefits of STV/approval/range in the single seat case is not just that they elect a candidate better than plurality, it is that they allow better voter expression. Even if someone loses an election, they could still be getting a better election/election share of the vote, keeping their supporters interested and also demonstrating to the incumbent a possible demographic to appeal to. Tactical voting works against that. If people tactical vote, then they get no method to express their actual desired. > > Proportional range voting is simialar, except that it must occur in sets > (where the sets are the amount of points that may be given to each candidate > in the system). You add up the points 1 at a time, and whenever adding > another point completes a set, reduce the value of the next points the > person has given out by V / M * 2 + 1. > > So, here's an example of a rating that would be given to an outcome. > > This is an election for two seats, with four candidates. > > Range is 1-100 > > voters ballot: A: 25, B: 125, C: 1, D: 75 I assume that should be: A: 25, B: 100, C: 1, D: 75 ? > Comparing this against outcome A, B: > > The voter gave out 125 points for A and B combined > > So the first 100 points count full strength for this outcome, and the next > 25 count 25/ 3, or 8.333... > > So the voter gives out 108.3333 points to this outcome. Another method that might be a good idea would be to limit the total number of points that can be given based on multiple candidates. For example, in PAV, the max I can cast is: 1: 1 vote 2: 1.3333 votes 3: 1.5333 votes 4: 1.6762 votes So switching to range, it would be limits: 1: 100 2: 133 3: 153 4: 168 You would vote giving each candidate a score. However, the above limits would be in effect based on how many candidates are being considered, so you don't overvote. In your election, a ballot of ( A: 25, B: 100, C: 1, D: 75 ) would become: AB: 100+25 = 125 => 125 AC: 25+1 = 26 => 26 AD: 25+75 = 100 => 100 BC: 100+1 = 101 => 101 BD: 100+75 = 175 => 133 ( limited to 133 as 2 candidates ) CD: 1+75 = 76 => 76 In effect, your approval for an outcome is just the sum of your approval for each of the individual candidates elected. However, there is a limit to prevent any one vote from becoming to strong. This still collapses to PAV if all the voters vote 100 and 0 for every candidate. > Now, continue this process for all outcomes, then for all other voters, > sum the amount of points each voter gave to each outcome, and the outcome > with the most points wins. For larger elections, it would probably be better to use the sequential method. Otherwise, there will be incentive to use computers for counting/ recording the votes, which increases the potential for corruption of election officials. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info