At 10:50 AM 9/1/2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >The trick for getting something like that to work is to keep the >standard as general as possible while at the same time allowing people to >do anything that they might like.
Sure. There are two problems here: (1) How to set up DP and other filtering systems that are not top-down, that have thoroughly decentralized control. (2) How to set up a web site that filters information in such a way as to automatically select material likely to be of interest to the reader, that is not excessively redundant, that is prefiltered. The second problem is of high interest, to be sure. It's an opportunity awaiting the entrepreneur. And, indeed, of course, there are also many efforts along these lines. However, problem 2 is really a different problem than problem 1. The solution to problem 1 may *use* solutions to problem 2, but it must not be dependent on any one of them. We do have a standard in mind, a very simple one. It's been described whereever we have participated in an effort to set up DP. It is the proxy list. It is simply this: It is a tab-delimited (or so convertible) database, with one record per member. The essential fields are: Member Handle, Designated Proxy, Proxy Acceptance, Comments. Additional fields may be added by applications. The "Member Handle," in a completely open system, could be the member email address, likewise with the proxy, but generally we assume that privacy will be protected, so a system address, a user ID for the site involved, may be used. Wikis can handle this easily, leaving a record of who edited the file for each edit, so we can confirm, if needed, that it was the member who added his or her record and designated the proxy, and it was the proxy who accepted. We assume and highly recommend, however, that proxies have the email address of the designating client, and we likewise assume that an accepting proxy provide direct contact information to the accepted client. An automated system could make all this convenient, but it can be done manually, it is not *necessary* to depend on systems. Which means that associations will not be dependent upon programmers.... but may use programs as appropriate. How this list is *used* is a separate question. Current thinking is that the association, if large enough, will provide certain tools, but the data used by these tools will be generally available, and so to most forms of analysis can be done entirely independently of central control. To use a proxy list with a vote list, which is not the only application, a list of votes would again be in or accessible in tab-delimited form. The essential fields are: Member Handle, Vote, Comment. So an obvious tool would be a program that would take a vote list and bring in information from a proxy list. Where a member has not voted, but has named a proxy, such member votes would be expanded by assuming that the proxy's vote stands as the member's vote. Many voting systems currently show votes-in-progress. It's an option with yahoogroups. So any member who cares can see how their proxy voted (or can see if their proxy has voted at all, and if not, if there is a higher-level proxy standing in), and, if not satisfied, can simply vote directly, which the member can do in any case. The vote mechanism is a standard one, recording the name of the voter and the vote. *The system does not add proxy votes, it only records raw votes.* We assume that many votes would be reported both in raw form and expanded. If there is a substantial discrepancy between the raw vote and the expanded vote, one might want to do further analysis. For example, one might determine from the proxy list who are highly-trusted proxies, and see if the voting pattern is different there. From other lists, perhaps open caucus lists, one might determine if there are factional patterns. One may also be able to detect fraud. Generally, in Free Associations (FAs), it is not necessary to do heavy fraud detection, precisely because fraud will become visible in vote patterns, and because FAs are not majoritarian systems, ultimately, because of their ready fissioning and reconstitution. Basically, those who suspect that there is a large fraud block can simply disregard what they consider fraudulent. The FA does not force anyone to do *anything*, it merely creates opportunities for communication, coordination, and cooperation. Worst case, the fraud creates an apparent majority and admin decides to accept the fraudulent vote and disable, say, the DP system. But the entire system exists in records held by the members. Every proxy has, we foresee, the email addresses of their clients. They don't need the central system to maintain communication, the central system is merely a convenience, one which can be reconstituted in a very short time. Proxies generally will have not only their own client's direct email, for example, but also that of, naturally, their own proxy, and many will also have the email addresses of all or most of their fellow direct clients of their proxy, and they may have even more than that. Thus even missing links in the system can be bypassed. This is a cellular system and could have applications under dangerous conditions; however, secrecy creates the potential for central control; we do not consider it necessary to solve the difficult problems at this time. We are working on open systems, which we expect would be very difficult to corrupt. >Anyway, for something like a proxy system, you could try to >come up with an API. On the one hand, it could be argued to be >centralised. However, even in open source software, they >still use standards. A good standard is one that streamlines >ensuring compatibility while at the same time doesn't limit >the various methods of implementation. The essential tools are not at all the problem. Those tools could be written by any programmer, for some in minutes. Take a proxy list and use it to analyze a vote list and provide an expanded vote. Or, for example, monitor a proxy list and periodically issue a notice to members of closed loops below a defined size in comparison to the organization. The system does not prohibit loops, but loop members should know if there is any reasonably possibility that they will be unrepresented in high-level discussions and polls.... >If you did a really good job, the API could cover a wide range of >methods. One person might implement it with an online forum/mailing >list and other might implement it with physical meetings and both >systems could interact due to the API. There are people working on the tools. See the googlegroup top-politics. >One option here would be to have a button where a person can click >"agree" or "disagree". There would then be a total near the post. I think these tools exist and are in wide use, actually. I've certainly seen them. >I wonder if something like a super-wiki would work. This could >have multiple versions of the same article being editted and also >some way of merging two slightly different versions of an >article together. Again, all these tools can and will be useful. But the basic system should depend on none of them. I have seen more than once that DP has been considered a software problem, and when the software was lacking or buggy, DP was abandoned. Completely unnecessary! It's like voting machines. The amount of labor involved in manually counting votes is actually small compared to the labor involved in *voting*. To save a small amount of labor, we have, in many jurisdictions, implemented automated systems which vastly increase the potential for fraud. Penny-wise and pound foolish, or simply quite clever? Might be both. The penny-pinchers cut back on expenses, and then the sharks move in. > > Part of the problem was that they understood "proxy voting" to be > > absentee voting. I quite understand this objection. Someone who is > > not present cannot generally have followed the discussion and respond > > to the various amendments or arguments that may have arisen. > >In fairness, with proxy voting there could be a (large?) group of >people who will insist that there proxies do just that. Whether or not this is even feasible depends on voting procedures. We are recommending, in fact, standard voting procedures where those participating vote. The voting procedure is blind to proxy voting. Proxy votes are *added* based on analysis. In such a system, there is no method in place for a proxy to cast a vote for a member which is different from his or her own. Now, if a proxy is willing to vote against his or her own best understanding, simply to please a client, the proxy is free to do so. I seriously doubt, though, that such a proxy would be widely trusted! (Not in a DP system with an established culture expecting good service -- i.e., direct communication -- from proxies. In a populist system, early on, it might happen, and it could be quite dangerous.) No, if the member has an opinion different from the proxy, the member may vote directly in the systems we contemplate. Our systems leave people the freedom to be foolish, and they have no opinion, specifically, on whether or not a member is foolish in directly voting. It is simply a right of the member to have his or her own opinion and to express it. But we also expect that proxies will communicate regularly with members in a fashion similar to what has been envisioned below.... Proxies will be in the best possible position to move member opinion, and this is the reason why we expect that allowing proxy votes to stand in for member votes will generally converge on a reasonable expression of the opinion of the electorate. *After the electorate has had time to consider an issue, which might even be after a vote.* That is, proxies will be, in a sense, leaders. But not governors. > However, >if they were in the same room as the debate, they would be more likely >to be reasonable. Yes. A meeting may, perhaps, not allow those not present to vote. Certainly this is presently Standard Operating Procedure for face-to-face meetings. As a chair under Robert's Rules, I would not allow the entry of an absentee vote unless the established rules specifically permitted it. Depending on conditions, I might be more likely to allow a proxy vote, if the proxy was understood as having the freedom to alter the vote according to the proxy's best understanding. Proxy voting is *not* absentee voting. Absentee voting does not require any proxy at all. A proxy who is simply casting an absentee vote can be replaced by a piece of paper and a stamped envelope..... >I wonder if "asynchronous voting" could help with that. > >Something like: > >Proxies attend town meeting and discuss issue. > >Proxies contact the people they proxy for over the following >week or so and explain what was discussed at meeting and how >they will be voting Yes. Sort of like this. Or they might have discussed an issue already with their clients, and then attended a public hearing, they take back what consensus, if any, was found, they discuss it, they take back further questions that they could not answer themselves, etc. *Communication.* Thinking of proxies as voting agents is not more than a small part of the concept. In FA/DP applications respecting Town Meeting governments, there really isn't any proxy voting. There is just the communication and generation of consensus. When there is sufficient consensus, there is practically no need for voting; that is, the existing voting methods will simply ratify it. (yes, a faction could attempt to pack the Town Meeting. Which, I can tell you, would go over like a lead balloon; even if successful, that vote would not last long! Town Meeting towns already operate mostly on consensus. Many Town officers run unopposed, simply because they have such broad acceptance that a contest isn't really needed. What I'm trying to introduce is something that will improve communication, so that we don't see the disconnect represented by Town Meeting voting, for example, to approve and borrow the funds for a Public Safety complex, which is then voted down through the mandatory submission to the voters at the next secret-ballot election. I know *exactly* why this happened. It isn't intimidation at Town Meeting. It is simply that the voters weren't sufficiently informed, nor was the Town Meeting proposal broadly enough discussed, there remained unresolved issues. At lot of planning effort was wasted because of poor communication. Bringing everyone in through DP, *before* holding votes, will, I think, work much better. That DP could revolutionize politics is a side-effect, here.... but, of course, I'm quite aware of it! >Anyone can withdraw/transfer their proxy at this stage At any stage. But it is simpler, if we are only talking about one issue, to vote directly. >2nd meeting held for the actual vote This is common process, actually, many issues require two meetings to be resolved, if I'm correct. >This means that nobody can vote unless they have at least >received a report from their proxy about what happened >at the meeting. No, people can vote whenever they want.... but, with such a system, they will have the *opportunity* to get a personal report. My comment on the Public Safety complex vote was that nobody from the town called me up to discuss it with me. When I saw it on the ballot, I thought "I haven't the vaguest idea whether this is a great proposal the expenditure necessary, or it is a boondoggle to provide a palace for the fire and police." And I did ask one person active in town government, and she happened to be one who thought the proposal premature. So I abstained from voting on it. Many voters, however, will instinctively vote against a tax override, which is what this was, unless they are convinced of the necessity. It is simply not amazing that it failed. And it shows how there can be a gap between Town Meeting and the voters. Town Meeting is the collection of those willing and able to be *active* in Town government. It is a skewed sample, skewed by the selection criteria, and further skewed by being those most knowledgeable about the actual proposal. DP attempts to deskew the representation, at the same time as it broadens the discussion and amplifies the trust of citizens in general in the town government process. It is *very* important for the introduction of an FA/DP organization like this to not be seen as an attack on the existing government. Changes often are made at times of polarization. This is one best made when things are *not* so polarized. >This would allow compromising of one issue against another, >the proxy could say "well I know this isn't what we wanted, >but if we agree, then we get this other thing that we wanted." Under present conditions, proxies don't have binding votes to cast, except their own. A proxy, under present conditions, becomes only a communications link; but this is actually the most important function and voting is not crucial. Yes, when there is conflict and major division, voting becomes important, but I do expect that such conflict will not be as common where we have FA/DP organizations in place. Once there *are* such organizations, they will be much better able, not only to judge if legal changes should be made (such as changing state law to allow proxy voting at Town Meeting), but also to collect the political power to actually get the law changed. >It could very well come down to organisational "culture". I am >not so sure that there won't be alot of people who won't pick >proxies who are unmovable by debate. Picking a proxy you trust >is hard. Picking one who will vote a well defined way on every >issue is alot easier. And a lot more frustrating. Politicians are famous for making promises that they don't keep. And, in fact, if politicians always kept their promises (the kind of promises that they currently make), the whole system would break down. We are not trying to change human nature. We are simply trying to *use* human nature to create more effective social intelligence. Proxies who are ideologues are, generally, *not* trustworthy, and, further, they will not be good communicators. I don't think that proxy systems will amplify their power, quite the reverse. DP systems will dilute their power. They will still be there and they will still have followers. But they won't be gatekeepers, people will have other choices.... In the FA/DP environment, the ideologues are welcome to their own opinions. The FA is not going to contradict them. But caucuses can and will form to counter special interests (and ideology is a kind of special interest). FA/DP organizations don't link issues. There are people who are deeply opposed to abortion. And to war. One might think these positions quite compatible! However, present public politics pretty much requires a Hobson's choice of these people. They may make a rough calculation of what they see as lives lost. Hmmm. a hundred thousands lives in this war vs millions of lives by abortion. I guess I have to support that pro-war candidate because he opposes abortion. The public process won't immediately change if we manage to create FA/DP political organizations. But it will become much more possible for *true* pro-life candidates -- that is anti-abortion *and* anti-war -- to gain traction, to find a support community. (I've just chosen these issues as familiar ones, not to express any personal opinion. Sure, I've got those opinions, and strong ones! But that's not what is going on here.) >The issue is that for any kind of negotiation, there must be a >penalty for not coming to an agreement. Time is often used as >the penalty. Consider this. There is an FA/DP political organization, perhaps it is Metaparty (http://metaparty.beyondpolitics.org). There is a group which thinks that we should immediately withdraw from Iraq, and therefore we should create a campaign fund for candidates who agree to support this. Another group thinks that this is surrender to terrorism, and that we should support candidates who disagree with withdrawal, who will push through toward victory. Let's say that the numbers are 55% withdrewal and 45% stay-the-course. Okay, if they form the actual PAC that collect money -- the FA is not going to do this, and every member of each faction contributes to their respective cause, and, let's say, there are 10 million so-active members and each one contributes an average $20, we are going to spend $110 million politicking in one direction and $90 million politicking in the other. What a huge waste! If we can find some position that would enjoy a broader consensus, we can work for it, and not only will our efforts not mostly cancel each other out, but we will, if we have broad representation within the organization, i.e., our organization represents to some degree society as a whole, also not have such a difficult time in the political market. We will already be proposing something broadly acceptable, and it may not be necessary to spend so much money. ($20 each? How much would *you* spend in a reasonable attempt to resolve this issue? It is costing each of us, on the average, thousands of dollars in taxes, just from a financial point of view alone, not to mention the lost lives. If we continue uselessly, what a waste! and if we withdraw prematurely, what a waste! How much effort is it worth, to find agreement? The existing political system thrives on disagreement, it fires up voters. Where is the "Let's Find Agreement" Lobby?) FA/DP, because it leaves power (i.e., money and votes) decentralized, strongly favors, I'd suggest, consensus solutions. And the DP structure makes it much more practical to find consensus, by breaking down the discussion into relatively small groups. Why won't it work? There are lots of reasons. I'd suggest they are worth looking at. I think there is a way. It's happening, the discussion has been broadening. Over the last year, I'd say, far more people are aware of the DP option, and some of them are recognizing that there just might be something to this FA stuff. (People with extensive experience in existing FAs may already know that, and, for years, I've known people who said, "If only the rest of the world could function like this...." But what was not known was how to scale it. DP is an attempt at solving the problem of scale, while still preserving the rigorous anarchist/libertarian concepts behind FAs.) >If a person/group is willing to sit at a meeting for 2-3 hours >and not budge an inch, then it can be implied that they really >care about the issue (or as you say have alot of time on their hands). >This also applies in buisness negotiations, if a person spends all >day and isn't willing to lower their price, then maybe it really >would bankrupt them. Yes. However, as the meeting gets smaller, in general, the process also gets easier. The time expands rapidly as meeting size grows. Smaller equals better, as long as the meeting does not get so small that it no longer broadly represents the diversity of position and opinion in the association. That's the trick, and DP is designed just to jump through that hoop. >The Senate Filibustering system is the same kind of thing. If you >are willing to meet the filibuster consditions, then you likely >care more about the issue. Yes. And then there are those who simply care about winning, and who threaten to simply disregard the rules by interpreting that they don't apply, even though they patently do. This is the nuclear option, and we already experienced it, essentially, in the 2000 election, when the Supreme Court utterly disregarded its own precedent and the Constitutional process for resolving disputed elections, to issue a ruling designed to produce a desired outcome. There is no other explanation, and apologists for the court have essentially argued that the court is a political institution, get over it. (The chair can rule pretty much anything if a majority will sustain it. Of course, some people have ethics and would not rule contrary to precendent and clearly stated standing rules, but others.... Of course, such an august official as the Vice-President of the United States would never do that, would he?) (And I thought that the Supreme Court was likewise far more worthy of respect. Boy, was I mistaken! Tbhis is not about having voted Democratic. I've experienced a lot of lost elections, and I *never* before felt that it was an injustice. It was simply not having convinced the American people.... but, ahem, I digress!) >Hmm, maybe proxy voting could be assumed to be a method to remove >the cost to the individual of being a hold out? (and that would >be a bad thing) The cost is still there for the proxy. Proxy representation establishes a far more effective freedom. Yes, freedom can be abused, but that proxy still has to slog through. The *individual* may not have an incentive not to hold out, but the individual is not sitting in that meeting, the proxy is, and, I don't know how many times I have to repeat it, the proxy is not a rubber-stamp, unless he is willing to so serve.... I think the practices will work themselves out. Having simple votes that are *not* proxy votes and then expanding them in analysis means that the proxies are *not* casting their client's votes. They are casting their own votes. The analysts then make of it what they will. In an FA, the goal of voting is the measurement of consensus. Votes in FAs, except for pure process issued, don't move money and power. It is a *different* environment, so a lot of conventional political thinking and habit will not apply. > > Town Meeting allows all citizens of the town to vote directly on Town > > issues by attending Town Meeting. However, there is a huge group of > > Town citizens who are effectively locked out by this. For starters, > > single mothers.... Town meeting is always held in the evening, and it > > can go on late on occasion. There is no absentee voting at Town > > Meeting. And, of course, proxy voting is not allowed. > >Systematic biases are obviously a bad thing. What about something like >this: > >The total amount of time for a town meeting is divided equally between >all potential voters. > >When you set someone as a proxy, you are granting them the right >to use your time allocation. That might work. If you are there, you have your own time, which you can voluntarily yield to anyone. That is, in fact, how the Senate often functions..... >Time not used in one meeting can be carried forward to the next (with >probably a limit to how much can be stored). A proxy uses up the same >amount of time for all people he is proxy for, so they all bear the >burden equally. It can be done. If it is worth the effort, it will be done.... When the meetings are relatively small, it isn't necessary. Meetings can vote to close debate, and they can vote to censure members for whatever reason they choose, if someone takes up too much time and refuses to yield. Relatively small meetings can work all this out, they generally will go overboard to ensure that everyone who wants to speak gets to. It is when they get too large that the problems become intractable. Proxy representation will allow meetings to get smaller, I think. The large meeting will be replaced by a smaller central meeting and *lots* of informal meetings taking place throughout the town, phone calls, etc. >No vote on an issue is final until nobody wants to spend any >more of their time trying to convince others to change their mind. It's called standard Robert's Rules. Except that debate can be closed, normally, with a two-thirds vote. Unless the chair decides that the decision of the Majority Whip is final, and a majority dutifully agrees that, yes, this is what the rules really mean! Aagghh! >No meeting may run for longer than the planned duration. Give that one up! Meeting majorities have the absolute right to extend or shorten meetings.... "Motion to Adjourn!" Undebatable, simple majority carries. "Motion to set aside the Orders of the Day" Also undebatable, simple majority carries. (The Orders of the Day would include a preset time for adjournment.) >A >meeting may end early if nobody else wishes to speak. Votes >which haven't been finalised by then, are tabled until the next >meeting. Tabling unresolved issues is quite common. Sometimes it is to allow time, sometimes it is an attempt to kill a proposal without debate. >This means that everyone has equal time to speak. If you really >don't want an issue passed, you can have your proxy use up all >of your time holding out and preventing the issue from being >finalised. However, this means that you lose power for other >issues as you have spent all your time on this one issue. The idea needs work. But, yes, sometimes time-allocation systems can work. It is very difficult to get people to keep to them, though. >Also, there would probably be a rule that some time (say 25-33%) is >"free" and speakers are picked at random. This would given non-proxies >(who probably have only 30-40 seconds "in the bank") a chance to speak. The fact is that if you can't convince any of the proxies who are present to speak for you, you have little chance of accomplishing much at that meeting. But, yes, it could be done. >In practice, there might even be a rule where a proxy can say >"... and I speak for 15 more minutes". He wouldn't have to actually >speak, it would just remove 15 minutes from the maximum time the >meeting can run. That is a truly interesting idea. But I don't think that meeting maximums would fly. Indeed, most of my work is toward standing meetings, as by mailing list or other forum. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
