Quoting Raphfrk: >> I wonder if this is sorta similar to a Borda count in terms of Clone independence. ***
A clone doesn't appear to help in the case of a circular tie, so a party wouldn't have an incentive to run similar candidates. A "spoiler" clone is possible, as your example below points out, though it requires a circular tie. *** >> For example, if voters, A,B,C vote >> A: A>B>C1>C2 >> B: B>C1>C2>A >> C: C1>C2>A>B >> A>B>C1>C2>A ... >> The lowest ranked box is 4,4 and it is empty. The next lowest is (3,4) and (4,4) and only 3,4 has votes in it. >> C2>A, C1>C2 and A>B have pairs in that box. The only pair left is B>C1. Thus, B wins? *** Actually, C1>A and B>C2 are also left, but you are correct that B wins with this method. By ignoring A>B, you can keep the other five pair comparisons (B>C1, B>C2 C1>A, C2>A, and C1>C2), and come up with one unique order, B>C1>C2>A. *** >> I am not 100% sure if I have understood you method correctly. However, by weighting lower preferences lower, the C "Party" has reduced the weighting of A>B in ballot C and C2>A in ballot B. Without the first one, the votes become: >> A: A>B>C1>C2 >> B: B>C1>C2>A >> C: C1>C2>A *** In ballot C, does A=B or is A>B? *** >> The effect seems to be opposite to Borda, cloning can result in your least favorite winning. That would likely lead to 2 party domination if cloning hurts a cause. *** Adding a clone of C allows the voter for B to show how much he or she dislikes A, which is where this method fails IIA. It does obey (I think) Local IIA though, since any spoiler would have to be a member of the Smith set. If two candidates are close enough to be clones, and if there were two other very strong candidates, there would be an incentive for the two clones to join forces in certain circumstances. *** >> Is your method equavalent (or very similar) to the following method. >> 1) Voters rank N candidates >> 2) M=N >> 3) Ballots truncated to M rankings *** Pairwise comparison are truncated, but only the ones necessary to resolve a tie. In your example above, by ignoring the bottom-ranked A>B, you resolve the election to B>C1>C2>A. It's unnecessary to ignore C1>A and C2>A, which are also in the same box. *** >> 4) Condorcet winner is elected, if existing >> 5) Otherwise, reduce M by 1 and goto 3) *** 4 is correct. If in 5 you mean move up one box (in a 4-candidate race, this means going in the order (3,4)(2,3)(2,4)(1,2)(1,3)(1,4) ) you are correct. *** >> What about this instead >> 1) Voters rank N candidates and include a range score >> 2) M=N-1 >> 3) Ballots reduced to at most M clear preferences, least strong preferences equalised first >> 4) Condorcet winner is elected, if existing >> 5) Otherwise, reduce M by 1 and goto 3) *** I think Range-voting variants are interesting, though as votes become more strategic they become more Approval-like (I like Approval a lot for its simplicity and generally good behavior). *** >> Ok, so I could fill in the following ballot: >> A1: 1 (99) >> A2: 2 (97) >> B: 3 (90) >> C1: 4 (0) >> C2: 5 (1) >> The voter messed up the ballot for C1 and C2 and also didn't rank E1 or E2. >> In effect, that preference will be equalised first due to the contradiction (shown in bold below). >> So, my ballot would effectively be >> Round 1: A1>A2>B>C1>C2>E1=E2 (from ballot) >> Round 2: A1>A2>B>C1>C2>E1=E2 (already has 1 equality so no change required) >> Round 3: A1>A2>B>C1=C2>E1=E2 (-1 point difference between C1 and C2) >> Round 4: A1>A2>B>C1=C2=E1=E2 (1 point difference between C2 and '0') >> Round 5: A1=A2>B>C1=C2=E1=E2 (2 point difference between A1 and A2) >> Round 6: A1=A2=B>C1=C2=E1=E2 (10 point difference between A2 and B2) >> Round 7: A1=A2=B=C1=C2=E1=E2 (90 point difference between B and C1) *** If I'm reading it right, Round 6 is equivalent to Approval voting. If you can, could you show how this method would resolve a Condorcet cycle (you can use a different example if there's an easier one). I'm trying IFNOP with four examples from the Schulze method's page on Wikipedia. I'll post them in the next couple of days. Michael Rouse [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
