At 08:01 AM 11/2/2006, Michael Poole wrote: >The Majority Criterion is an objective criterion.
It looks that way. When you look closer, there are some ragged edges. What does "prefer" mean? Is there a threshold in preference strength below which it is effectively the same "rating." I.e., the voter might make a choice, if forced to by the method, but really has no *significant* preference. Further, it is alleged that Approval does not satisfy the Majority Criterion. It seems to me that this requires a few assumptions that have not been made explicit. > When you ask about >preference strength, it becomes extremely subjective -- and attempts >to normalize the subjective effects (for example, rescaling each >voter's expressed preferences to a common minimum and maximum) obscure >honestly expressed preferences. While one can reasonably complain >that objectively defined measures to not maximize subjective goals, >the superiority of the subjective measure should be established[1] >first. Doublespeak, I'd say. It is quite clear that there is some basis for variation in preference strength. It's real. It is no more subjective than preference itself; simple preference has taken the complex space of voter expectation and has reduced it to a binary relation. A lot of data is lost. Is that data of value? I've shown situations where it clearly is of value, where the Majority Criterion will clearly choose a winner who will be a disaster for the society. And historical examples can be shown. >Ultimately, social utility is not a static function[2]; election >results alter the function both directly and indirectly. Yes, of course. But the very idea of elections is to derive some kind of conclusion from the state of the voters at the time of the election. This very idea is defective, that is, not optimal, but once we accept it, that further expectations will change after the election is irrelevant. The election is attempting to determine "the choice of the electorate." And we are attempting to define what that means. Essentially, how is the choice made, and for what purposes and to what ends. If we don't consider the ends, but merely consider a very limited metric, on the argument that this metric is "objective," even though it is entirely based on subjective comparisons by all the voters, we end up with an artificially constrained result that will be distorted, under some conditions -- I would argue that it is commonly so -- away from optimum. Of course "optimum" is a subjective judgement, unless there is a way to measure it. The only way that I have seen proposed is Social Utility. And Range is the method that attempts to predict this, using voter expectations and assuming that these expectations are, on average, related to the actual utility. It's called democracy. It is an assumption that, more often than not, the people will be right. But, of course, this does partially depend on how we determine what the people want. It is patently obvious that a very slight preference, the voter would be, really, equally happy with A or B, is quite different from a strong preference, where the voter will be devastated if A wins and happy with B. You know, I've voted Democratic for a long time, but I was never truly *distressed* at a Presidential election result until 2000 and then 2004. I would not have rated the Dem as 99 and the Rep as 0. In 2000, I was distressed, not because Bush was winning, but because the *process* was unjust, a result of a whole series of twists of Constitutional intent. Then, I hoped that Bush would be as he claimed to be, a "uniter not a divider." We have not had a President so divisive in my memory. What does this have to do with Range? By 2004, I *would* have been voting Range 99 or perhaps 98 for Kerry and 0 for Bush. Yet my vote counts exactly the same as the vote of someone who has almost no preference, who is dithering up until election day as to whom to vote for. Now, one may say, and it is said by Range opponents, why should my strong preference have any weight over the weak preference of another? *Because strong preferences predict the relationship of the voter with the resulting government.* Ignoring strong preferences results in voter alienation. From it being "our" government, it becomes "their" government. And this is at the root of a great many social problems. In no way should my strong preference outweigh the strong preference of another voter. And Range (and Approval) give all voters equality in strong preference. They can vote that way. So if "prefer" in the definition of the Majority Criterion were worded "significantly prefer" -- so significant that it will clearly affect voting behavior -- Approval will satisfy the Majority Criterion. The only way that one gets Approval to fail the criterion is by assuming that there is a preference that is unexpressed. This is clear because it is claimed that Plurality satisfies the Majority Criterion. But if a majority of voters prefer C, but vote for A under Plurality because they don't realize that they are in the majority, and worry that B will win, we have a Plurality election which does not satisfy the Majority Criterion. Essentially, Approval allows the expression of preference. Prefer A over B? Vote for A and not B. Same as Plurality. So Approval satisfies the Majority Criterion. Range, however, does not, I think. But it does not because the Criterion itself totally neglects and ignores preference strength, whereas Range measures it. > Given the >upset caused by the last two US elections, this feedback is perhaps a >factor in your argument that an election should maximize social >utility. It's a general argument that does not depend on the last two elections. > However, I suspect negative feedback makes the system >unstable by encouraging radicalization by opposing factions. An >unstable objective makes it more important to explain why that >objective should be sought. The present system is unstable, in my opinion. Range ought to be more stable, because it does not switch radically based on small perturbations. However, any single-winner method is vulnerable to instability. Parliamentary systems should be more stable, if elected by true PR. However, my own opinion is that instability is inherent when power and communciation systems are blended, because the blending causes amplification of majority opinion; there is feedback, and it is positive feedback. So small perturbations initially can radically swing the output. Generally, negative feedback reduces instability.... >[1]- Any proposal to maximize social utility that is to be taken >seriously in the US should avoid arguments that could be rephrased or >paraphrased as seeking "the greatest good for the greatest number" -- >those are too easily comparable to communism, which had its own >failures due to preference for subjective over objective measures. Yes, that's true. However, the greatest good for the greatest number argument is an old one, and has been used by conservatives as well as others. The "rising tide lifts all boats" is a greatest good argument. It is arguing that what makes the rich richer also makes the poor richer. Maybe. Sometimes. Maybe sometimes it does the opposite.... >[2]- Suppose that 5% of the populace have no preference between two >major candidates, 50% have a slight preference for one, 40% have a >slight preference for the other, and 5% have an irrationally strong >preference for the second. "Irrationally strong" is the introduction of a judgement of preference. It is assuming that voters have a preference for the wrong reason. And then, of course, we should, it will be alleged, disregard that preference because it is irrationally strong. But people with irrationally strong preferences have just as much right to have their preferences respected as anyone else. Indeed, I could argue that they should have more right than that of those with weak preferences. I gave the pizza analogy. Suppose that the strong preference of the anti-pepperoni "voter" is "irrational." He fears that he will die if he eats pepperoni, and, since we are defining it as irrational, he will not die. Now, if 100% of the population will be reasonably satisfied with Mushroom pizza, should we choose Pepperoni merely because a majority -- perhaps a slight majority -- have a slight preference for it? In the example given, if we do *not* disregard the strong preference of the "irrational" group, but if we have Range Voting, we end up with *100% of the electorate being satisfied by the election. This is how Range Voting is supposed to work. But it does not satisfy the Majority Criterion unless we follow the analogy with Approval Voting and claim that the meaning of "preference" in the Criterion is "strongly prefer." Strongly enough to rate the preferred candidate at maximum and all others at zero. If a majority of voters have that strong a preference, their preferred candidate cannot lose. I claim that this satisfies the substance of the Majority Criterion. What is really true is that the Majority Criterion was not designed to deal with election methods where preference strength is considered. It sounds good as long as we don't think about preference strength. Yes, it is just a Criterion, but it is intuitively obvious as a desirable criterion until we start thinking about preference strength. I pointed out elsewhere how, sometimes, it is sound knowledge that leads to strong preferences. Voters, without knowledge, can be easily confused, all too often. Some of them have strong preferences based on other than knowledge, but this does not change the fact that people, for example, who personally know or who have other forms of sound knowledge about the candidates may have, as a result, strong preferences. The only way that a majority can have a preference under Range and not have their preferred candidate win is if the preference is weak. And, by definition, then, they will not be seriously dissatisfied with the election outcome. They *must* have given a decent rating to the actual winner. > Include distasteful-to-somebody third >parties as needed for rescaled ballots to reflect honest preferences. >If the irrational strength of preference by 5% of people outweighs the >slight opposite preference by 10% of the population, it seems more >likely to push some of the 50% group to their own irrational extreme. I don't find this cogent at all. At least I couldn't understand it. Could be my fault. Or it's late. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
