Hi,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 09:46 AM 11/16/2006, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >A1 then wins as A1's supporters defected on the agreement even
> >though A2 was the least supported candidate and a minority of
> >the A party liked the candidate.
> >
> >This incentive could result in B winning if both A2 and A1's
> >supporters did it, which results in a minority candidate winning.
>
> The "Burr dilemma" is not a voting system problem, it is a party
> politics problem. The voting system, quite properly, is unconcerned
> about internal party politics. Approval Voting is not, in itself,
> party-list PR.
>
> If a group of voters agree with another set of voters to vote in a
> certain way, and some of them fail to perform on the agreement, it is
> absolutely no concern of the election method. It is not an election
> method failure, period.
However, there doesn't have to be an actual agreement between two
factions in order for this problem to be interesting. If the method
offers voters incentive to behave in such a way that when their faction
is represented by multiple candidates, this faction is penalized, then
as a result, political parties will not want to run multiple candidates
appealing to the same portion of the electorate.
Kevin Venzke
___________________________________________________________________________
Découvrez une nouvelle façon d'obtenir des réponses à toutes vos questions !
Profitez des connaissances, des opinions et des expériences des internautes sur
Yahoo! Questions/Réponses
http://fr.answers.yahoo.com
----
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
