>Forest Simmons: Here's a version that is both clone proof and monotonic:
The winner is the alternative A with the smallest number of ballots on which alternatives that beat A pairwise are ranked in first place. [shared first place slots are counted fractionally] That's it. This method satisfies the Smith Criterion, Monotonicity, and Clone Independence. --WDS: this is an elegant method! Note that it is IMMUNE to my "DH3 pathology!" http://rangevoting.org/DH3.html It is strategically pointless to "bury" (lower artificially) a rival to your favorite below some non-entities, because if those nonentitites are never ranked top, doing so makes no difference. And it satisfies mono-add-plump and mono-append (two Woodall criteria)! And it is simple! ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
