> Benham: By this definition Range fails "ICC" because voters can only express preferences among clones by not giving maximum possible score to all of them, thus making it possible that if a narrow winner is replaced by a set of clones all the clones lose.
--no. The definition in the problem statement said "slight" preferences among clones. By slight, I meant, to be formal, infinitesimal. > Benham: >>Note: Many voting systems are known (beyond just variants of range voting) >>which satisfy AFB >Many? There is MCA, ER-Bucklin(Whole), one or two Kevin Venzke methods and what else? --the puzzle page I was citing, http://rangevoting.org/Puzzlepage.html gives a hyperlink to a page explaining "many." That page is http://rangevoting.org/FBCsurvey.html There are in fact an infinite set of such methods mentioned there, albeit most are variants of range voting. Warren D Smith http://rangevoting.org ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
