Dear Warren, you asked how the NPV bill could be combined with Condorcet methods.
First of all: In my opinion, we should always promote a concrete Condorcet method rather than Condorcet methods in general. I recommend that we should promote the Schulze method: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf I suggest that the NPV bill and the Schulze method should be combined as follows: Suppose state X has adopted the Schulze method. Then, to calculate the NPV winner, state X should interpret an individual ballot for candidate A from a state, where FPP is being used, as a preferential ballot where this voter strictly prefers candidate A to every other candidate and is indifferent between all other candidates. Similarly, an individual ballot from a state, where IRV (or some other method) is being used, but where this state refuses to publish the data needed to calculate the pairwise matrix, should be interpreted as if this voter strictly prefers his top-ranked candidate to all other candidates and is indifferent between all other candidates. The Schulze method should then be applied to all these ballots. And the electors of state X should have to vote for the Schulze winner. Advantage of this suggestion is that also the other states are encouraged to adopt the Schulze method. Markus Schulze ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
