Forest,
--- Forest W Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I'm beginning to suspect that in the presence of equality and a
> reasonable definition of the ICC in that context, the AFB (FBC) and the
> ICC are compatible.
I think it is possible, for instance if you give a point for every
ballot on which the candidate isn't ranked last or equal-last.
For that to work the definition of "to clone" needs to require that
new clones be ranked either all equal-last, or all above-last. Since
"equal-last" could just be truncation, I don't think this is a problem.
What is interesting, is whether any properties can be added to these
two. Majority favorite or a pairwise comparison in particular.
> Consider River, for example, where the drainage system is set up
> according to minimum opposition, i.e. the drainage follows the paths of
> least resistance.
>
> Voting favorite equal top with compromise in that scheme would not
> directly harm compromises chances. Would it harm them indirectly
> without giving the win to favorite?
It can, even with three candidates. (Same winners as Schulze in that
case.) It satisfies FBC to merely regard minimum opposition, but not
to add a scheme to this that will satisfy Condorcet.
Kevin Venzke
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