On Tue, 2007-02-06 at 19:43 -0800, Forest W Simmons wrote: > Here's a slightly different approach to Hay Voting: > > Suppose that a typical voter votes the range ballot v=[x1, x2, x3]. > > The ballot adds to the respective virtual accounts of the three > candidates amounts of > > x1/r, x2/r, and x3/r , > > where r is the L_2 norm of the vector v. > > > A dart board is colored with three colors with areas in proportion to > the candidate account totals.
Forest, under your scheme, you would never want to add votes to any candidate whose utility is lower than the expected utility of the dart board. This means that you would never reveal which of two bad candidates is worse. ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
