concerning what happens with an honest+strategic voter mix under range voting:
http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html the interesting findings include 1. despite the worry that strategic voters occurring in ways correlated with politics might penalize the honest voters, the sim shows that range is still top of the heap versus the other voting methods even in situations designed to exhibit this effect. 2. except that adding a top2-runoff after range, can and does help if the percentage of strategic votes is high enough. 3. Under these circumstances (i.e. 50-50 strategic+honest mix) range indeed produces honest-voter Condorcet winners more frequently than Condorcet voting methods such as Schulze Beatpaths - which it seems to me really hurts them at the most fundamental level. A web page on range voting criticisms is now available at CRV: http://rangevoting.org/RVcrit.html Warren D Smith http://rangevoting.org ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
