Scott Richie:
So, wait, was half the Condorcet electorate strategic voting by doing >order
reversal? Are we making the assumption that strategic voting is >exactly as
common in range and Condorcet in these simulations?
Abd:
That would seem to be an unjustified assumption, of course. However, the
*only* way to vote strategically in Condorcet is to reverse order.
I reply:
No, not really. Theres strategic truncation, and theres strategic
equal-ranking.
But I agree that the only conceivable way to have a strategy _problem_ in wv
Condorcet would be if people are doing offensive order-reversal strategy.
Scott Richie:
. >That seems a bit strong, exactly because the risks are different and the
>information required is greater for Condorcet.
Abd:
One thing that Warren's work seems to have done is to answer the common
objection to Range that sincere voters will be harmed by strategic voters.
I reply:
No, he hasnt shown that to not be so. Its obvious that it will be so.
Abd:
That doesn't appear to be true, with a necessary qualification. "Harmed"
must mean "Significantly harmed." Further, as I've noted, the meaning of
"strategic voting" is different under Range. It could only refer to
"magnification." Which isn't order reversal, it's quite a different animal,
and, it can easily be argued that it is *not* insincere.
I reply:
Abd is playing word-games. Define sincere how you want to, but RV will
make people afraid to fully vote Favorite over Compromise, because that
would prevent them from fully voting Compromise over Worst. Which part of
that do some people not understand?
In Condorcet wv, you can fully vote both of those pair-wise preferences, and
theyll both be fully counted.
Mike Ossipoff
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