[EM] Warren RV reply

[Michael Ossipoff]

WDS: In IEVS, presently, equal rankings are forbidden in rank-order 
methods.
MO: which (like Warren's other assumptions) makes the results meaningless.

--WDS: While I agree it would be nice if IEVS did equal rankings, and I plan 
to make
a future version do that,
(a) I do not agree I ever made any "assumption" here.

M.O.: If you didn’t assume or believe the premises you based your simulation 
on, then even you must not have believed that your simulation’s results 
would have any relevance to real-world elections. Shall we call them 
simulation-premises instead of assumptions then, to avoid any speculation 
about what you were thinking?

We could play word-games about what “assume” means, but if your simulation 
is based on counterfactual premises, then its results won’t mean anything. 
Have you heard the saying “Garbage in, garbage out”?


WDS: (b) I do not agree every result in the universe that concerns rank 
order voting methods
is "meaningless."

M.O.: You mean that not every result in the universe that concerns ranked 
voting methods disallowing equal ranking is meaningless? Of course not--they 
have meaning for elections in which equal ranking is disallowed. Of course 
no one is proposing such a version of Condorcet.

MO: If Warren wants to make RV look good, then he'd be
well-advised to not compare it to Condorcet. Continuing to do so will only
make RV look really shabby.

--WDS: I resent any implication that my goal with IEVS is to "make RV look 
good."

My goal is to investigate data and compare voting methods

M.O.: …and let the chips fall where they may. A laudable goal.

WDS:

, as opposed to figuring I have
all the answers at the outset.

M.O.: Again, the right attitude. But, though no one should claim to have all 
the answers, I do have one answer regarding RV: It’s impossible, in RV, to 
fully vote Favorite over Compromise while fully voting Compromise over 
Worst. Voters will have to choose which to do. They’ll thereby be faced with 
a strategy dilemma. Do you fail to help Favorite against Compromise all you 
can, fail to fully oppose those who vote Compromise over Favorite, or do you 
fail to fully vote Compromise over Worst.

Can’t you just hear the lesser-of-2-evils progressives: “Yes Nader is 
better, but we have to be pragmatic. We have to do all we can to help the 
Democrat beat the Republican, and that requires giving maximum points to the 
Democrat, voting the Democrat equal to Nader.

As I’ve said on EM before, Approval would be fine for me as a voter. It’s 
for the other voters, who badly misjudge what is acceptable, that we need a 
method, Condorcet, that doesn’t require that judgement. Now, with RV, those 
LO2E progressives _could_ give the Democrat a little less than Nader, but, 
from what I’ve always heard from them, one shouldn’t count on that. Because 
that’s possible, I’ve said that RV could be better for our elections than 
Approval. Because that isn’t likely, and because any points given to a 
Democrat weakens your Nader>Democrat vote, RV doesn’t even come close to 
Condorcet’s strategy-freeness.

So, though I don’t claim to have all the answers, I am giving you the above 
answer. Don’t keep trashing and embarrassing RV by comparing it to 
Condorcet.


Abd: One thing that Warren's work seems to have done is to answer the 
common
objection to Range that sincere voters will be harmed by strategic voters.
MO: No he hasn't... It's obvious that [Smith is wrong].

--WDS: I believe Abd was referring to the following:
  http://rangevoting.org/StratHonMix.html

M.O.:


Suppose the Nader>Hillary Clinton voters sincerely rate Clinton at 
half-maximum, half of their rating for Nader. Suppose they sincerely vote 
that rating. And suppose the Clinton-preferrers consider Nader a rival, and 
downrate Nader to zero. Sincere voters are being harmed by strategic voters. 
Harmed by their own sincerity.

That will often happen to some degree.

If Warren claims to have proved that it won’t, then examine his premises (we 
won’t call them “assumptions”, because that would imply that he assumes his 
premises accurate, and he has said that he makes no such assumptions).

Actually that isn’t what concerns me most. The progressives will likely give 
maximum points to Clinton even if they don’t sincerely rate Clinton that 
high, thereby abandoning their chance to fully express their preference for 
Nader over Clinton.

The familiar lesser-of-2-evils problem is alive and well with RV.

Mike Ossipoff


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