Warren Smith wrote: > Ossipoff: But if Warren has a quibble about what it means to fully > vote X over Y, then > I refer him to my criteria SFC, GSFC, and SDSC. > > --WDS: here is the definition of SFC given by Ossipoff (CW=Condorcet > winner): > "SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a > majority of all the voters > prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win." > Ossipoff: "[SFC] is met by SSD and other good wv Condorcet versions." > Ossipoff: "I call [SFC] the pinnacle of the promise of rank-balloting." > > However, Ossipoff is wrong. Here is a counterexample. There are 3 voters: > A>B>C > B>C>A > C>A>B * > where the * vote is insincere. The unstarred two voters are a "majority" > who prefer the sincere-CW (who is B) over C, and who vote sincerely. > But the total vote > is a 3-way perfect tie. Therefore C can win. But according to > Ossipoff's SFC, C cannot > win. This counterexample works against every Condorcet method > satisfying anonymity. Sorry, but you have overlooked the "no one falsifies a preference" clause: In your example, the third voter does falsify a preference.
Yours, Jobst ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
