Warren says:
Indeed, > "SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a >
majority of all the voters > prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote
sincerely, then Y shouldn't win." here is a stronger property: SFC2: if
there's a CW, and no one falsifies, then the CW wins. And this property is
obeyed exactly by Condorcet methods. Warren D Smith
I reply:
SFC2 is met by no method. What if a large number of voters truncate the
CW? That isnt falsifying.
But if you make SFC2 meetable and useful, then you have my wording of the
Condorcet Criterion, which I posted here years ago.
Condorcet Criterion (Ossipoffs wording):
If theres a CW, and if everyone votes sincerely (as Ossipoff defines
sincere voting), then the CW should win.
[end of Condorcet Criterion definition)
CC is not a stronger property than SFC. CCs premise requires that everyone
vote sincerely. SFCs premise requires only that a majority vote sincerely.
It is because CC is weaker that CC is met by every pair-wise-count method,
while SFC is met only by the wv Condorcet methods (and maybe a very few
other methods).
With SFC, that majority has its guarantee as long as others dont falsify.
With CC no one has a guarantee unless _everyone_ not only doesnt falsify,
but votes sincerely, as I define sincere voting.
Mike Ossipoff
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