Lomax says:
Nevertheless, Warren has a point. He states conclusion based on thin
evidence, yes. But he does this when there, essentially, is *no* other
evidence.
I reply:
No, not really. There is evidence that no one here proposes Condorcet
without equal rankings. Strong evidence, in fact. Based on that strong
evidence, Warrens simulation (so far at least) has no relevance for
Condorcet as proposed here.
Maybe Lomax is new here, but others have done simulations of Condorcet and
simulations of RV. Warren is not a pioneer by doing that, Mr. Lomax. Maybe,
however, hes the first to do a simulation which assumes that voters will
vote equally sincerely in Condorcet and RV, and will not vote equal
rankings.
Lomax continues:
In this particular field, we have a whole lot of theory that is not grounded
in either real elections *or* simulations.
I reply:
and we have simulations that are not grounded in reality.
Guarantees about what a method will or may not do may sound too theoretical
to Lomax, who seems skeptical about :a whole lot of theory. But provable
statements about what a method will or wont do have real application and
relevance more real than a simulation. Certainly more real than a simulation
based on false premises.
Lomax continues:
Most of the methods we favor have either never been tried, or they have been
tried only in very limited circumstances. Warren's simulations are limited,
yes. But they are all we have.
I reply:
I dont know where Mr. Lomax has been, but others have done simulations of
single-winner methods, including Condorcet and RV.
Lomax continues:
Mr. Lomax likes to post very long and rambling messages. Im only replying
to a few statements.
Lomax continues:
With pure ranked methods, order reversal is necessary, but with ranked
methods which allow equal ranking, strategic voters *can* avoid order
reversal. But then they are voting exactly as they would with Range!
I reply:
except that defensive equal ranking is only needed if theres a threat of
order-reversal. A threat of order-reversal that hasnt been deterred by the
possibility of the easy and natural punitive countermeasure, defensive
truncation.
Lomax continues:
How does a voter decide whether to rank equally, assuming the method
>permits this? That is up to the voter, who will sometimes see two
>candidates as equally worthy and then be thankful for being able to >vote
accordingly. Absolutely. Look, the point was that allowing equal ranking
can be expected to improve election outcomes as measured by Bayesian
Regret. Sure, voters may use it to indicate equal approval, but what is
more interesting here is how strategic voters will use it, if they wish to
avoid downranking their favorite. With equal ranking allowed, they can use
Approval strategy.
I reply::
Mr. Lomax, you havent really examined Condorcet strategy, have you.
among these lost. If one really wants absolute, 100%, full vote strength,
doesn't want to chance that even one thousandth of a vote could flip the
outcome, then Range ballots could provide a means of indicating ranking with
equal rating. But the question is whether or not this would provide a
significant benefit to society? I'd suggest that considering elections from
the point of view of utility leads us to conclude that it would not provide
any measurable benefit. Personally, I'd like to encourage voters to vote
sincerely. Sincere Range maximizes utility precisely because it sums
expressions of utility from each voter. The only question is the behavior of
Range under conditions of insincere, strategic voting, and there is a huge
amount of hot air on this subject. And only one person who has studied it in
a more grounded way. Warren Smith.
I reply:
but gounded in what?
Lomax continues:
Note that, if I am correct, Condorcet himself received criticism of his
method based on a comment about strategic voting. He dismissed it, saying
that his method was for honest voters.
I reply:
You are not correct. That was de Borda, the initial proponent of Bordas
method. I believe that it was Condorcet who point out to de Borda the
strategy problems of Bordas method.
What is the ideal method for honest voters? I'd say that if we can't agree
on that, we aren't even going to get close to agreement about what is best
when voters opt to vote strategically. For reasons that I won't detail at
this time, though, my expectation is that Range will behave well in the
presence of strategic voting. Any significant harm done is likely to fall
upon the strategic voters, not on the honest ones.
I reply:
Justification for that statement?
What was it that Lomax said about hot air?
Sincere RV voters will be had by strategic voters. And no, that doesnt
require a simulation.
Mike Ossipoff
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