Dear Forest, you wrote:
> If I understand your method correctly, it is a refinement of the > following method which is based on so called "ranked preferences" > wherein the voters have some way of expressing their own relative > preference strengths: > > Three ballots i, j, and k are drawn at random. Let A, B, and C > designate their respective top candidates. > > IF ballot i expresses A>C>>B AND ballot j expresses B>C>>A, THEN C is > elected, ELSE a fair coin is tossed to decide between A and B. Yes, I would say so. > Would there be any incentive in this crude imitation of your method for > voters to express false relative preference strengths? Hm... Assuming the "ranked preferences" ballot allows me to simultaneously indicate A>C>>B for each pair of options A,B,C for which I prefer A to C and C to B and for which I prefer C to the fair A/B-lottery, and simultaneously indicate A>>C>B for each pair of options A,B,C for which I prefer A to C and C to B and for which I prefer the fair A/B-lottery to C, then I would think that under your method there would be no incentive to misrepresent any preferences or relative preference strengths. Do you have in mind a particular coding scheme other than ratings? I'm not sure how such a scheme could look, since it would not suffice to indicate the relative strength of the n-1 preferences between neighboured pairs but would rather require to specify the relative strengths of all n(n-1)/2 pairwise preferences! For example, in the case A>>B>>>C>D>>>>E it is unclear whether the voter prefers C to the fair A/E-lottery or vice versa! Yours, Jobst ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
