At 11:34 PM 2/15/2007, Stephane Rouillon wrote: >Sorry to target an honest idea, >but my main critic about random methods is the fact that >results are not reproductible. Thus, the incentive for fraud >is huge and the electors confidence within the system should drop >with time...
It depends. What is interesting about the proposal is that the randomness isn't like, for example, Random Ballot. Rather, it moves between two alternative methods, each one of which alone is as good or better than existing standard methods. By doing this, it encourages honest voting. But it isn't going to reverse the decision of a majority, for example, as long as both methods obey the Majority Criterion. Fraud becomes possible with this system if it is possible to manipulate the selection. But such fraud could be quite risky, and would not be as rewarding as ordinary election fraud. And it is possible to arrange the determination of a random number in a public way, such that it cannot be anticipated or manipulated except through a conspiracy of all parties involved. For example, all candidates (and possibly some others) provide a sealed envelope with a random number in it, say a four-digit random number, chosen by whatever process the person chooses. The envelopes are collected at a single meeting, in public. The numbers are summed and the least-significant two digits are the number used to make the method selection. In order to predict the result, you have to be able to control *all* contributions. If even one escapes you, you have nothing. And if all the candidates wanted to control the outcome by agreement, well, more power to them! ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
