RV’s strategy problem in comparison to Condorcet is a subject that we’ve already discussed. RV’s strategy problem in comparison to Approval is that sincere voters can be had by strategizers.

You might say, truly, that a person can make the choice about whether they want sincerity or strategic power. Maybe you’d rather vote sincerely than maximize strategic advantage. Make a statement by voting sincerely. Yes, but now imagine that it’s an important issue, and you’re on the side of the more sincere voters. Your faction is going to be had. You won’t like that.

Our public elections are the exception, for me, because when the progressives who would approve H. Clinton and Nader might give Clinton a little less than Nader in RV, that’s a good thing, in my opinion. That’s why public elections are the exception to RV having a strategy disadvantage with respect to Approval. I fully admit that that exception is based on my own opinion of what’s wrong with progressive voting tendencies.

Approval doesn’t put people in the position of choosing between two drastically different strategic and sincere ways of voting, and it won’t make you regret the sincerity of your co-factionists.

Mike Ossipoff


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