Dave said:
There can be debate as to remembering A=B. For each 2 such votes I would
count as if there was 1 each of A>B and B>A.
I reply:
A>B and B>A would make sense if youd power truncated A and B. But saying
that theyre equal is not the same as saying that each is better than the
other.
Dave continues:
Power truncation: As I read Michael's words, it would get remembered as C>D
and D>C - does not look useful.
I reply:
With N candidates in the election, for each candidate that you
power-truncate, your ballot casts a pair-wise vote for each of the N-1 other
candidates over him/her. Useful? Its extremely useful, because it lets you
give the worst vote-against that could be given, to as many candidates as
you want to.
Dave continues:
ARLO? Seems complicated beyond believable value
I reply:
I certainly wouldnt include ARLO or power truncation in a first Condorcet
proposal. But if, later, there was concern about strategy, those options
would be good solutions.
The value of ARLO, and power truncation, is tremendous, for the timid voter
whose sincere ranking could otherwise be distorted by strategy concerns.
ARLO and PT are better than the favorite-betrayal or unnecessary equal
ranking, etc., that a strategy-timid voter might otherwise feel the need to
do.
Condorcet has practically zero need for ARLO and PT. But they could reassure
the strategy-fearful voter.
Dave continued:
Think of an election for governor. Why should we not expect some Republicans
to place all non-Republicans below the line, and some Democrats to respond
in kind?
I reply:
So? Whats wrong with that? It will make it easier for Nader to beat the
Republicans <smiley>. But, seriously, it has to be assumed that the voters
know what theyre doing and will use the options in their own best interest.
Mike Ossipoff
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