Kevin says:
We could define Condorcet on sincere preferences also.
I reply:
We could and do. I define Condorcets Criterion based on preference. By
preference I mean what you mean by sincere preference. Its really the
only CC definition that makes any sense.
Lomax says:
The > Condorcet Criterion has *nothing* to do with measuring SU. It's just >
a guess at a beneficial method, an intuititively satisfying one that > turns
out to miss something extremely important.
I reply:
The CW has everything to do with SU, because, when voting is spatial, based
on distance in issue-space, the CW is the SU maximizer every time if that
distance is measured as city-block distance (as Ive argued that it should
be). If the distance is measured by Pythagorean distance (also called
Euclidean distance), then the CW is always the SU maximizer under such
commonly-assumed conditions as multidimensional normally distributed voters,
or uniformly distributed voters.
Intuitively satisfying? <smiley> The CW beats everyone, in terms of
preference. Typically beats everyone by preference majorities. Such a winner
is the most stable, because there can be no majority opposition after the
election. The CW is the ultimate compromise, and compromise is very much
part of single-winner voting.
Lomax continued:
here is no real alternative to positing sincerity. *No* method can >
guarantee good results if the voters don't disclose their opinions!
I reply:
Yes, and thats why the defensive strategy criteria are essential. RV fails
most of them. It fails SFC, GSFC, and SDSC, criteria that are met by SSD and
BeatpathWinner.
I wasn t going to comment on this discussion, having already had my say
about it, but there were a few comments in its two most recent postings that
I wanted to comment on.
By the way, my EM presidential poll includes Range Voting. I could have set
the election up at a website that does automatic counting, but those
websites dont support RV, and a number of people here like RV. Besides, the
automatic counting websites dont prevent someone from voting 20 times. One
Republican EM member could easily make McCain or Romney win. Though the
result isnt the important thing (Demonstrating the voting and counting of
the methods is the important thing), its still better if the result isnt
distorted by cheat-voting. Hence the posted-ballot poll.
Mike Ossipoff
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