I'll start with order-reversal, because that's what Juho's example was about:
Order-Reversal: In the example below, the A voters prefer B to C, but are using offensive order-reversal in order to take victory from B. The B voters could be regarded as not having a preference among A and C, or considering A to not deserve a vote, or they could be defensively truncating (but with margins it won't work, and they need more drastic misrepresentation of their preferences in order to save B): 101: AC 100 B 50: CB The B & C majority prevent A from winning by merely not ranking A. This is an SDSC example. And it's a margins SDSC failure example. Truncation: Either the A voters prefer B to C, but are employing offensive truncation (successfully in margins), or they don't have a preference among B and C, or maybe they're just being lazy, or are in a hurry. If they prefer B to C, then B is the CW, just as in the previous example: 101: A 50: BA 100: CB Again, A wins in margins. The offensive truncation succeeds. Or, maybe lazy or hurried truncation took victory from B. Truncation doesn't affect wv in this way. With no one falsifying a preference, the B & C majority can keep A from winning merely by voting sincerely. This is an SFC example. And it's a margins SFC failure example. Mike Ossipoff ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
