On Feb 25, 2007, at 14:54 , Michael Ossipoff wrote: > > I left a few words out of this posting, so I'm re-posting it in more > complete form: > > Juho-- > > I told you this: > > With wv, when there's a CW, there's always a Nash equilibrium in > which the > CW wins and no one reverses a preference. > > With margins, there are situations in which the only Nash > equilibria are > ones that involve order-reversal, even when there's a CW. > > How does that make you feel about margins?
This one did not change my feelings much. If you'd say something similar about sincere votes, and would provide examples that demonstrate that this can happen in real life and that the game theoretic choices would be obvious to the voters, maybe then. But now this seems a bit like one addition to the long list of theoretical claims about the properties of different methods. The impact of all the different theoretic criteria to the applicability of the voting methods in real life situations is not that easy to estimate. This criterion sounds a bit tailored to me. I find the "no strategies"/"sincere" border line more interesting target of study than the "no reversal" border line. I also don't like the Nash equilibrium game in the sense that approach seems to indicate that requiring strategic changes in the ballots is ok. I'm trying to stay and keep the voters within the sincere voting model. In the subsequent mail you discussed the name of the criterion: > Sincere Nash Equilibrium Criterion (SNEC), or > the Unreversed Nash Equilibrium Criterion (UNEC). Using some variant with word "unreversed" sounds more exact to me than a variant with word "sincere". Juho P.S. Just an observation, in case you are interested. Few months back I wrote on this list about "Ranked Preferences". One reason behind discussing such methods was to see what alternatives there are to truncation and winning votes (for situations where strategic threats are _considered_ so bad that basic Condorcet methods without any protection methods (e.g. mm(margins) ) are _considered_ not to be enough). > > Mike Ossipoff > > > ---- > election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for > list info ___________________________________________________________ Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
