>Criterion: Adding a candidate who is pairwise defeated by the current winner may not cause a different winner to be chosen. >wds: are there any pure rank-order methods that obey this criterion?
--WDS: Equivalent criterion: removing a candidate pairwise defeated by current winner, cannot alter the winner. So in an A>B>C>A cycle, in which (say) A wins, removing B cannot make C win. However, C must win for any method reducing in the 2-candidate case to simple majority vote (since C>A pairwise). I conclude that Matthijs van Duin's criterion is failed by every reasonable voting method based on pure rank order votes. He says DMC satisfies the criterion. I may be confused, but I don't think so. wds http://rangevoting.org (please correct me if I'm confused.) ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
