Dear Scott, you wrote: > That seems really lame. Such a method would certainly fail to elect A > even if there was unanimous consent! What do you mean by that? Unanimous consent about A like in
100%-x: A 100, C 90, B 0 x: B 100, C 90, A 0 with very small x? In that case, only somewhat more than x of the A-voters need to bullet-vote for A to have almost 100% winning probability. E.g.: 100%-3x: favourite A, also approved C 2x: favourite A x: favourite B, also approved C Resulting winning probabilities: A: (100%-3x)*(100%-x) + 2x ~ 100%-2x B: x*3x ~ 0 C: (100%-3x)*x + x*(100%-3x) ~ 2x So in this case it elects almost certainly the favourite of the broad majority and only with a very small probability the compromise option. Jobst ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
