Dear Chris, you wrote: > TACC having that curious property and so electing B here shows that > it spectacularly fails the > Definite Majority criterion. Maybe that is forgivable for a FBC > method like MAMPO, but not for a > Condorcet method that bases its result on nothing but pairwise and > approval information.
You're perfectly right here. It was before we studied definite majorities and found DMC that I proposed TACC. Unfortunately, there is no method that elects an option which is both uncovered and has not definite majority against it, simply because such options might not exist: Example: Pairwise defeats A>B>C>D>A, D>B, C>A, hence covering relation D>>A Approval scores A>B>C>D, hence definite defeats A>>B>>C>>D. It seems we have to decide whether we consider definite defeats or covering defeats more important... Jobst
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