Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>Def. DAMC (Definite Absolute Majority Choice): >---------------------------------------------- >Make a list of absolute majority size pairwise defeats. > Process this list in order of descending approval score of the >defeating option. Keep the defeat at hand iff (i) the defeated option >is not already defeated by the kept defeats and (ii) the new defeat >does not build a cycle with those defeats already kept. > From those options not defeated in the end, elect the most approved >one. > >In other words: We use River with > defeat := absolute majority size defeat >and > defeat strength := approval score of defeating option >and resolve the remaining ambiguity by Approval. > > >I'm pretty sure that this method has the following properties: >- monotonicity >- clone-proofness >- IPDA and ISDA >- immunity from absulute majority complaints (in the above sense) >- immunity from 2nd place complaints >- the winner is never defeated with absolute majority by a more approved >option or by the most approved contender. > > >What I'm not sure about so far is whether using Beatpath or Ranked Pairs >instead of River gives the same winner, and what would happen when we >used the "resorting" or the "definitively defeated" version of DMC with >absolute majority size defeats only. > Jobst, Does this meet FBC/SF? Because I think something that fails Condorcet and Irrelevant Ballots and presumably Definite Majority would want to. Chris Benham > > > ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
