Because DAMC recognizes majority defeats, and because River is similar to Ranked Pairs, a Condorcet version, DAMC lilkely meets SFC & SDSC. Because of having Ranked-Pairs as a relative, DAMC might also meet GSFC.
Because it recognizes only majority defeats, that might confer FBC compliance: You can bury your favorite to reverse a defeat, but it won't change a majority defeat, because your opposing vote can't do anything about the number of people who have ranked your favorite over your compromise that you're trying to save. But DAMC's complexity is at least equal to that of Ranked-Pairs Condorcet, so it doesn't share MDDA's super-brief definition advantage. Complexity-wise, it's definitely in the Condorcet class. And, being so similar to RP, DAMC probably needs a rule to deal with mid-count ties--an awkward thing about RP. So Condorcet is what DAMC has to be compared to. But maybe it does very well against Condorcet, if it meets everything wv Condorcet meets, and FBC besides. That would be a new record in criterion compliances. So far nothing has been proposed here that meets GSFC and FBC. I guess it wouildn't meet Condorcet's Critrerion--the price for disregardng submajority defeats. Still, there could be timid electorates who need FBC more than Condorcet's Criterion. As I said, these are just preliminary comments. Mike Ossipoff ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
