One way that DAMC _won't_ fails FBC: If a majority rank Favorite over Compromise, then, by voting Compromise over Favorite, you can't change the fact that a majority have ranked Favorite over Compromise, and so you can't get rid of that majority defeat of Compromise. That made it seem to me that DAMC probably meets FBC.
But what if Compromise loses because is has a majority defeat with not much approval strength, so it's kept fairly late in the keeping process. And what if, when you make Favorite have a majority defeat by some particular other candidate, a defeat with fairly strong approval strength, you can make it so that your new defeat completes a cycle such that keeping Comromise's defeat would make a cycle among kept defeats. Preventing Compromise's defeat from being kept lets Compromise be unbeaten, without which a worse candidate would win. Yes, that's just a sketch. An example would be needed to actually demonstrate an FBC failure. Can anyone say why such a scenario wouldn't happen? Mike Ossipoff ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
