Juho wrote:
>I don't see any strong need to use the PAW criterion (or >corresponding ratings variant) for strategy resistance or for >"election target" reasons but they seem possible. They add >complexity, but if justified for some reason, then why not. I'll try >to think more and come back if needed. > > I'm not suggesting that PAW be explicitly made part of the rules of any method, and the PAW criterion is met by most methods including the simplest. So I don't see how it "adds complexity". The Plurality criterion is about avoiding common-sense, maybe "simple-minded" but nonetheless very strong and (IMO)sound complaints from a significant subset of voters: the supporters of a candidate that pairwise beats the winner: "X ranked alone in top place on more ballots than Y was ranked above bottom clearly equals 'X has more support than Y', so how can you justify X losing to Y?!". PAW tries to be a generalisation of Plurality, and less arbitrary because it doesn't talk about top preferences. Chris Benham ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
