At 06:00 AM 3/20/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote: >Here intermediate values get mentioned, but it is a puzzle as to the >smart way to decide on values for such that will give me the >advantage that Range CLAIMS to offer.
Who benefits from intermediate values? Is it the voter? Not directly. *Society* benefits, by being able, to the extent that voters are willing to share this information, to make more balanced decisions. If you are interested in maximizing your personal effect on the process, you won't use intermediate votes, since they dilute your effect. (A midrange vote is not the same as an abstention, but it is similar in effect, if personal power is the goal.) This tension between the collective needs of society and the individual goals of the voter is visible in the alleged desirability of being able to indicate rank in the absence of a rating difference. Range gives the maximum effect to the vote if the voter votes extremes. But voting extremes for more than one is essentially an abstention in the pairwise contest between two rated the same. Many seem to desire to be able to participate in that contest, even when the Range method allows sufficient resolution that significant differences in opinion as to suitability of choices can be expressed. The problem is that by expressing that option A is a little less suitable than option B, one also reduces the average rating of option A in other pairwise contests, risking that, if other voters sufficiently prefer, say, C, C may win over A as permitted by this small downrating of A. It's actually not very likely, but certainly possible. And my point is that there is no social value apparent to me in allowing this discrimination; it simply encourages strategic voting. If you prefer B to A, that information is useful to society if there is some quantifiable expression of *how much you prefer* B. If you aren't willing to downrate B because of some other consideration, such as competition with C, what you are effectively doing is to withhold your actual assessments out of fear that the majority will move the decision elsewhere. I have argued that voters should be permitted to do this, but not that it is otherwise socially beneficial. I think we will get maximum social benefit when voters come to trust that if they honestly express their sense of choice suitability, the collective decision is likely to be sound, or at least as reasonably likely to be as sound as their own opinion. A great deal depends on the context of the process. If decisions are properly deliberated before vote, such trust is much more natural and reasonable. I'm much more likely to want to vote *powerfully* if I don't trust that others are properly informed. When I feel heard (or that people have heard what is to be said on a matter, whether or not it was me who said it), I'm a lot more willing to accept group decisions. I don't believe that I'm always right. Which does not mean that I consider that whatever the group decides is right, per se; it merely gives me some context. My opinion is that, in a group with good process, group decisions are, on average, more likely to be right than my opinion alone. The key to this, of course, is "good process." What is that? ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
