At 11:41 PM 3/24/2007, Dave Ketchum wrote: I accept Abd's suggestion to discard his words whenever they conflict with my goals.
>TO OTHERS! I welcome attempts at contributing toward using proxies >to improve quality of legislatures. And I'll note for others that while legislative proxy voting is interesting, aside from possibly Asset Voting to elect legislatures, the discussion is, shall we say, quite premature, when it gets into excruciating details of implementation. For me, it is enough to notice that proxy representation in legislatures would solve certain problems of government. The problem is that we don't know very well what problems it might introduce, and so I personally feel much more comfortable looking to experimentation with proxy representation both in NGO and in lesser assemblies. Town Meeting would be an interesting application; my impression is that it might conflict with state law, but I'm not certain about that. I'm quite interested in any real world applications of proxy representation, not just in the Free Association context. But the FA context seems to me to be a place where DP would solve the ancient problem of scale, without risk, since FAs don't represent a major concentrated asset, if you screw up an FA, very little has been lost. If there are members who want to continue it in a new form, they can easily do so. It's the nature of the beast. More traditional organizations typically represent an asset that, if it breaks, causes serious loss. The organization management is often the gatekeeper to the members, and this fact is then used to maintain the interests of existing management, and examples abound. It is quite possible to structure more traditional organizations so that these risks are minimized, but most people don't even realize the risk, much less how to avoid it. One more note: proxy voting is already used in some legislatures. In fact, it is a common objection to legislative practice, as if there were something wrong with it. In New York, apparently, legislators can vote on committees by proxy. I do not see anything wrong with this, with the provision that I would consider the legislator responsible for such votes as if he or she had cast them himself or herself. And I generally disrespect proxy voting used simply as absentee voting, i.e., directed voting; it is a disruption of deliberative process, which becomes moot. >>> I offer proxies as a way of populating a legislature. While >>> we both got proxies from the same source, there are enough >>> differences in the way they are used that you get nothing but >>> headaches if you mix Abd's ideas with mine. Actually, I don't think we both got proxies from the same source, though we are aware and have in mind one particular precedent use: corporate proxies. But I actually started with a representational system with a fixed structure and then realized that the fixed structure was more of a problem than a solution, so I allowed the voters to self-select the leaders, rather than having the voters associate first and then the group elects a leader. And *then* I realized that this was proxy voting. In other words, I started with something that more resembles Trees by Proxy and then eliminated the restrictions. All this, by the way, about twenty years ago, if my memory serves. Unfortunately, most of it was not written down.... >I believe reasonable delays encourage proxy givers to consider >carefully before changing proxy holders. In other words, create a hazard so that voters will be more careful.... If a voter comes to think that a proxy selection is a disaster, and the proxy is going to vote to bring us into a war that the voter doesn't consider necessary or appropriate or even morally allowable, too bad. Your vote will still go toward the war, unless you manage to anticipate the problem long enough in advance to avert it. Because why? Because Ketchum wants you to be more careful! Once again, looking at the precedents, what would you think of a health care proxy which you could not revoke while you are of sound mind? Essentially, important proxies are (1) always revocable at will, subject only to the rights of third parties to know whether or not the proxy represents you, which you can manage by direct notice to the third party as well as by other means, and (2) ineffective if the one represented makes an explicit decision. Ketchum is eliminating both of these protections, without explaining in sufficient detail why this is even remotely a good idea. He comes up with this: >Legislatures NEED time to prepare for changes in proxy holding (and >thus in membership and power of members). Sure they need time. However, the time necessary should be no more than a few minutes. Membership rules simply allow for latency. For example, a proxy might have floor rights because of having 1000 votes, the minimum. He loses a client. So, his floor rights continue for a period, maybe a day or a week or whatever is appropriate for the context. He just has 999 votes for that time. He never casts your vote without your continued permission. If this is not to be the case, there better be a stronger reason than what Ketchum has said. I have generally admitted that changing proxies during a vote might be problematic. But the critical time is not the voting process itself, it is when the vote is expanded by adding the proxies. And it is fairly simple to provide that a certain period elapses after a vote is taken before the expansion is done. This gives clients time to change their proxy if they think it that important. The point where changes would not be effective would be when the expansion analysis starts. There would be a gap there, perhaps as many as a few seconds. We *do* have computers nowadays.... More to the point, if there is a delay before expansion as indicated above, a voter can effectively cancel the proxy just for the vote in question, while leaving the proxy in place generally, simply by voting. If direct voting is allowed. A lot of votes -- most, actually, -- are intermediate process votes. These would have very short delays, so only a voter who was paying close attention would be likely to be able to vote directly to reverse the action of a proxy.... >Abd claims familiarity with Robert's Rules, as do I. I notice that >a body must obey laws, and any rules established for it by superior >bodies. It also may establish rules that cannot be too easily >changed without serious thought. I assume the same. As to rules of a "superior body," Ketchum might reflect on the "nuclear option" in the Senate. Are the rules of the Senate established by the Constitution? (No.) There are very few matters of Senate procedure that come from constitutional requirements. What was the "nuclear option"? It was a threat by the then majority, the Republicans, that the President of the Senate (Cheney) would rule a filibuster out of order, even though the rules and precedent would have been contrary to this. Then the majority would confirm the ruling, and it would be done. The Senate would have proceeded to vote on confirmation of a judge. This was considered dangerous and foolish, discarding precedent like that, but I saw no suggestions that it was illegal. The interpreter and arbiter of Senate rules, ultimately, is the majority. Note also that Robert's Rules allow an absolute majority to amend the bylaws, even without notice. The more usual understanding of a two-thirds majority applies only to majorities of quorums.... Robert's Rules really are thoroughly democratic, they place the majority above rules established in the past. But the majority disregards those rules at its own peril! >Still, I agree with what Abd writes elsewhere, that a holder should >have few enough givers that communication is practical. The invention of Delegable Proxy allows proxies to be assigned on a level such that communication is easy between the proxy and client. I don't fix the number, though sometimes I suggest twenty when a high level of activity is involved. Then the concentration necessary for efficient deliberative process takes place through delegation. This is quite directly a solution to the problem of scale in democracy, which was hitherto considered intractable.... you can read the reasons why in standard works on democracy, which for some reason have completely overlooked proxy voting as if it had nothing to do with democracy at all..... but I can more easily forgive not realizing the implications of delegability, since it is a totally new invention. (Well, hierarchical representation, with tribal councils, regional councils, national councils, is sort of like it.) >>> Borrow proxies fresh from corporate stockholder usage. Their >>>effectiveness starts at midnight 10 days after filing; ends 10 days after >>>a replacement is filed or signer dies. > >The 10 days is not from corporate usage, but from what I write above >about need to avoid instant response. And what is wrong with 10 minutes? >>> Representatives, such as Juho's 5 from a village in a town >>>government, have power according to how many effective voter proxies they >>>hold, directly or indirectly: >> >>> Must hold 1% of a legislature's proxies to be able to >>> vote there. > >I do not object to someone holding a single proxy, yet I cannot see >value in a collection of such trying to be serious members of a >board, even to investing enough time listening to deliberations to >be able to vote intelligently. I have not proposed that someone holding a single proxy have the right to address a board or assembly, unless permission is given. However, who is to decide if that single proxy has put in enough time too understand the issues? It's quite possible that this person has more knowledge and expertise, and has been following the debate more closely, than most active members of the assembly! The waste of time, if there is any, is that of the single voter or holder of a single proxy. For this reason, I consider, the vast number of votes cast in assemblies representing large populations will be cast by active participants. I expect. It might not be true. The ones who will decide are the citizens, and each one can decide for himself or herself. I just think that most people will realize they can leave it all in the hands of their proxy and just watch what particularly concerns them. >>> Must hold 2% of a legislature's proxies to have full >>>capabilities of being a legislator - offering bills, debating, etc. > >No magic in "2", but too many active members and they trip over each other. > >>> Limit on voting power is 40% of proxies voted in any vote - no >>>czars allowed. > >I SAID "no czars allowed", though my "40" is merely a suggestion. > >Responding to Abd's consensus - a chair's gavel is not made of >muscle - though the chair does properly respond when consensus among >the members is recognizable. And if the process allows ongoing review of the actions of a superproxy, the superproxy is not really a czar, he or she is merely the agent of some kind of consensus, revocable at any time, unable to make binding decisions except by majority consent. >>> Sideways proxy - possible for representatives to be too weak >>>above. Such can pass what they hold to others for legislature >>>participation. This does not release anyone from the above limit, nor >>>does it affect what anyone passes up to others via proxies. > >A village elder can pass up however many proxies are held to a town >trustee. This is partly for minority power, for elders from several >villages could combine to give their shared town trustee more muscle. I don't understand the reference to "sideways." The proxy is passed on, accumulating votes as it is passed. If elders "combine" to give their votes to someone up above, that is standard delegation. If one of them gives his or her proxy to another, a peer, this peer becomes "someone up above," at least a little. This is all simple delegable proxy, unless Ketchum means something else. DP preserves minority rights (in the same way as Asset Voting, but a little more flexibly). >Proxies held give the elder powers discussed above in village government: > > Holding enough, they can be active. > Holding too few, two or more can combine strengths to make one > of their number active in village government. While this could be > called a proxy, I see no reason to apply the same restrictions as > are discussed above. Why not? What are the reasons for the restrictions above that do not apply to "below"? Is it that village decisions aren't important? (It could be argued that they are the most important decisions of all, having the most impact on the lives of those who live in the village.) My argument is that the restriction is arbitrary and, with proper rules, unnecessary. The key to understanding this is to understand that the primary role of the proxy is to represent. Proxy government, done in a way analogous to corporate and other proxies, does not remove power from the individuals represented. Rather it expands that power, by allowing it to be exercised through chosen representatives. If a majority of people choose to be represented by some individual, what are you going to do? Refuse to recognize that representative? You'd be refusing to accept the free decision of a majority of people, who in the world are you to do this? The fact is that these people could, if they wish, easily change the rules, unless Ketchum's Rules somehow become untouchable by a majority. If a majority decide, though, that proxy representation is to be limited and constrained to so many percent of total votes, they will presumably address the problems that this creates. This limitation is often proposed by people new to the concept of delegable proxy.... I think it comes from a confusion between proxies and elected officials with terms of office. And thus it does follow as reasonable from the latency that Ketchum would build in with his rules. (Not even the U.S. Constitution is so untouchable, a distributed majority could amend it in short order. In fact, though, the U.S. rules are quirky, since a plurality could accomplish it, with certain distributions. It becomes understandable if we think of the U.S. as an assembly of states, not of people. But then the 3/4 rule becomes an onerous burden, if it were 50 individuals, we'd never want such a rule. In the end, the U.S. rules were a compromise that was not thoroughly worked out.) ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info