Approval Margins should have been on my list of most promising, even though it is not as well known as the three that I mentioned. Total Approval would not be that well known except that DMC has received a lot of attention, and DMC is equivalent to River(TA), etc. which, admittedly, may not be that well known.
A compromise between Winning Votes and Total Approval that doesn't go as far as Final Support would be this: The number of ballots on which X is ranked strictly above Y plus the number of ballots on which X is both approved and ranked equal to Y. I'll try to think if there is a good way to incorporate Approval Margins into some combination of the other most promising measures. Forest Chris Benham wrote ... > >Forest, > >Why isn't > >"Approval Margins: the number of ballots on which the pairwise winner is >approved minus the >number of ballots on which the pairwise defeated alternative is approved" > >on your list of "most promising measures of defeat strength.."? > >Chris Benham > > > >> >> > ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
