At 01:18 PM 4/19/2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >I was thinking about an easier solution to the vote management problem. >This is where it is sometimes in a party's interests to try to split >their support >equally between two candidate due to exhausted ballots. In effect, they >get a candidate elected without a quota.
In systems where there is discretion in vote reassignment, as with Asset, I have recommended that the quota be the strict proportional quota. For an assembly with N seats representing V voters, every seat is elected V/N voters. Yes, not rounded off. And, yes, there may be a seat left vacant, where those holding the remaining votes can't agree and compromise on some member. (I have no idea how rare or common this would be. It could be a large enough problem that more than one seat remains vacant. But I see some social benefit in the loss of representation of people who are unable to compromise! -- which compromise need not be on one who matches their opinions, but rather on one they can trust to *consider* their views and to present them to the assembly where appropriate. It is also possible for a member to be pledged to vote as instructed by some process agreed upon by disparate factions compromising on that member. I *don't* recommend this! If we understand, however, that present systems give these relatively isolated groups no representation at all, that they might, under some conditions, remain without representation, is far less a problem that it might otherwise appear.... STV, for example, gives them no opportunity at all.) If we further (as a separate reform, it does not need to be the original one) allow electors to continue to vote at the assembly level when they choose to do so, these isolated groups will lose only deliberative rights, not voting rights. Frankly, it looks like an ideal system to me. No compromises except what is absolutely necessary because of scale. (That is, there are no compromises at all if there is a procedure for electors to revoke their votes and thus effectively recall their chosen proxy in the assembly. That is a more difficult problem which I don't care to address at this time. It is a problem that doesn't even have the opportunity to exist at this time, when there are no public voters, and recall is a massive and cumbersome process, and not even practical with an STV assembly. -- many members would lose a majority vote on a recall election! if they represent unpopular factions, or, alternatively, if the member must get a quorum of support in a recall, one has asked the entire electorate to participate in order to affect one seat. Highly inefficient and, for that reason, dangerous. No, public voters are necessary for recall and direct voting procedures to even become possible.) ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
