At 08:32 PM 4/24/2007, Tim Hull wrote: >I know the Condorcet winner is preferred to every other candidate - >however, I'm in particular assuming ballots like this: > >48% - 10 D 2 PW 0 R >47% - 10 R 2 PW 0 D >5% - 10 PW 5 D 0 R > >(the numbers being the sincere range rating for the candidate) >Under Condorcet, PW would win despite the fact that he or she is >barely liked by anyone. >Under range and IRV, D would win. I know that Condorcet and IRV >don't use ratings, but you need to take into account >the fact that #2 is not always a strong #2 or is some eccentric joke >candidate.
I'm just noting that to understand what is really going on with an election, you need Range or Range-like information about preference strength. Range is simply the only method on the table that directly considers preference strength! ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
