Kevin Venzke wrote:
I think a better method that would achieve everything you are
trying to do with your method (technically
if not "psychologically") would be this:
"1) Voters indicate one Favourite and also Approve as many
candidates as they like.
2) Any candidate voted as favourite on 50% or more of the ballots
wins.
3) Eliminate any candidate whose max. approval opposition score is
greater than 50%, unless that is all
the candidates. [I'm not sure if that's possible].
Nope, that's not possible. You can only get this score if someone else
has majority approval and you don't. It's an MD filter really.
4) Of the remaining candidates, the two voted as favourite on the
most ballots go to the second round."
This uses a more expressive ballot and mainly confines the split-
vote problem to the "top" of the ballot.
So the normal recommended strategy in the 3 viable candidates
scenario would be vote the most preferred
of the 3 as favourite, and approve all the candidates you prefer to
the least preferred of the 3.
What do you think of that?
I've had this exact thought... I agree that on paper this should be
similar in effect and better.
Kevin,
Thinking about this a bit more, why not expand this into a fully-fledged
3-slot method?
"Middle-slot votes count only as approval for calculating max. approval
opposition scores.
Candidates with a Max. AO score greater than 50% of the valid ballots
are eliminated.
Elect the remaining candidate with most top-slot votes."
I think that would be like a CDTT method. Wouldn't we then have a method
that meets
Minimal Defense, a variety of Later-no-Harm (middle-rating candidates
can't harm the voter's top-rated
candidates),FBC and mono-raise; but fails Plurality, 3-slot Majority
for Solid Coalitions, and Irrelevant Ballots,
and has a sort of random-fill incentive?
What do you think of that? It seems so Venzke-like, have you ever
proposed it?
Chris Benham
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
