Yes. Sorry my wife's name comes up when I remote login... I think your statement is wrong. Let's try a counter-example:
3 candidates A, B, C and 100 voters. Ballots: 35: A > B > C 33: B > C > A 32: C > A > B Repetitive Condorcet (Ranked Pairs(winning votes) ) elimination would produce at round 1: 68: B > C 67: A > B Thus ranking A > B > C C is eliminated. at round 2: 67: A > B is the ranking B is eliminated at round 3: A wins. Now in which kind of ballot could an approval cut-off remove some support from A and give it to another candidate? Any ballot with A not in first position nor in last. Thus concentrating on the C > A > B voters to vote C | A > B instead of C > A | B removes final support from A and gives it to C. Not enough A still wins. Can we obtain an equivalent pairwise succession while raising the number of adjustable ballots (the ones with A in second position)? Let's add some B > A > C and try to adapt the others: 33: A > B > C 31: B > C > A 33: C > A > B 3: B > A > C Pairwise comparison would produce the same 3 round process (values are different). 66: A > B 67: B > C 64: C > A Let's put the cut-offs to disadvantage A: 33: A > B | C 31: B > C | A 33: C | A > B 3: B | A > C C is eliminated with 33 votes as support. B is eliminated with 34 votes as support. A is last eliminated but receives no rallying voters and finishes with 33 votes as support. B wins. This method is proposed within SPPA. Stéphane Rouillon Chris Benham a écrit : > Elisabeth Varin wrote: > > > I read several ways to mix Condorcet and Approval on recent mails. > > This is my favourite, using the latest proposed ballot example. > > > > I would suggest a Condorcet method usind residual approbation weights > > with an approval cut-off (noted "|" ). > > It's a mix of Condorcet, IRV and approval. > > > > The idea is: > > 1) to rank candidates using a Condorcet (ranked pairs, winning votes > > for example) method; > > 2) eliminate last candidate like in IRV and give him the weight > > according to the number of voters > > having that candidate as last approved; > > 3) repeat 1) and 2) until winner selection. > > Stephane (?), > Am I right in gathering that the approval cutoffs don't actually have > any effect on who wins??! > > Chris Benham > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
