On Dec 23, 2007, at 22:52 , rob brown wrote:
On Dec 23, 2007 10:49 AM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Now bak to the question. Majority vote may often not yield the
optimum outcome (from some chosen high level theoretical viewpoint)
but majority vote may well be considered to be the best practical
method for competitive two candidate elections.
Yeah, well that is pretty much my opinion. With the exception that
the "high level theoretical viewpoint" that supports Range (whether
in 2 candidate elections or ones with 3 or more), by ignoring the
competitive nature of elections, makes it a pretty non-useful
theory for elections held among human beings, who have a history of
being rather competitive by nature ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
War ).
It works pretty good for predicting how non-competive eusocial
animals such as bees might want to hold elections, however.
( http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html , http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eusociality )
Works with humans too. Three friends living in different places might
agree to meet at a place that has equal distance to all three homes.
Or they might select a place that minimizes the sum of the distances
(maybe they will share the travelling costs). Parents could agree to
watch a Disney movie with their child although they might like a war
movie more themselves. In that case they are maybe seeking a solution
that maximizes the worst of the three personal utilities. There are
many functions that can be used in determining the optimum outcome.
But in politics / competitive situations rules of course tend to be
different. And the election methods should be chosen accordingly.
Juho
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