Juho,
--- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >> Approval is simple only if you find it convenient to ignore such
> >> questions
> >> as "how should a voter vote to best
> >> pursue his interests?" If you happen to include such things in the
> >> equation, Approval mind-blowingly complex.
> >
> > I can't think of any (serious) method with more straight-forward
> > strategy
> > than Approval.
>
> What if we look at Condorcet at the same level of recommending a
> strategy that works well in most cases. The recommended strategy
> could be: "list the candidates in the order of preference". That is
> quite simple and understandable and works in most situations for the
> benefit of the voter.
>
> So, is Condorcet strategy more straight forward than Approval
> strategy? Approval strategy (e.g. "vote one of the frontrunners and
> candidates that are better") requires the voters to estimate the
> opinions of other voters while the described Condorcet strategy does
> not.
I certainly concede that Condorcet more frequently offers a useful strategy
that doesn't require much thought, but to my mind that's not the issue I
was considering. If you wanted to specify the "complete" Condorcet strategy
on the same level that we can describe optimal Approval strategy, I guess
the result would be extremely complex.
Kevin Venzke
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