Kevin Venzke wrote: > Hi, > > (Responses to Juho and Dan) > > --- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > >> Kevin, you maybe already know/guess my answer. B is only 2 votes >> short of being a Condorcet winner. C would need 3 and A 5 votes. >> >> In your comments I note that you may think that listing a candidate >> (higher than default bottom) has a special meaning. If there is >> something like an implicit approval cutoff after the listed >> candidates (=> 7 B>C>>A, 5 C>>A=B, 8 A>>B=C) then that should be >> explicitly mentioned. The used method could in this case count both >> the pairwise preferences and the approvals (A and C would be more >> approved than B), and the result could be something different than >> with pure ranking based ballots. >> > > I think WV agrees with the voter's nature more. In Margins if the > frontrunners are A and B, and there are a bunch of other poor candidates, I > may be expected to explicitly rank the worse frontrunner in second place in > order to stop my vote from being credited to random people. > > In WV I can abstain from those contests and thereby weaken their > importance. I don't think voters want to have to explicitly vote for the > worse of two frontrunners, and I don't think when they leave him and others > off they wish that this part should be filled out randomly. > > (I say "randomly": On average randomly has the same effect.) > > > --- Dan Bishop <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > >> * If truncated ballots were disallowed and people flipped coins to >> decide between the bottom-ranked candidates, then B wins with a >> probability of 43.19%, compared to 30.51% for C and a mere 0.45% for A. >> * Margins makes more intuitive sense than Winning Votes. The latter is >> equivalent to assuming that the people who didn't vote a preference >> between two candidates would have unanimously voted for the pairwise >> loser. The former is equivalent to assuming that they'd split their >> vote equally between the two, which is MUCH more likely. >> > > Can you explain how WV is "equivalent to assuming that the people who > didn't vote a preference between two candidates would have unanimously > voted for the pairwise loser"? Do you mean "...winner"? > No, I mean loser. Under WV, the following are equivalent:
A>B: 51 A=B: 49 A>B: 51 B>A: 49 > To my mind, the theory behind WV is that a contest is more decisive the > more people that participate in it. Only you mustn't count the voters on > the losing side, because they could then regret expressing their opinion > rather than indifference. > This is where we disagree. In my view, a unanimous contest with 30% turnout is more decisive than a 51%-49% contest with 60% turnout, despite the fact that the latter had more votes for the winner. > >From the WV perspective one could say that margins is equivalent to > treating unspecified preferences as aiming simply to increase the effect of > those contests on the outcome. > > >> But I see no justification for automatically assuming that "ranked" >> means "approved". >> > > How is there less justification to interpret an explicit marking for a > candidate as a type of "approval," than to interpret the unspecified > preferences as explicit indifference, and using this implied explicit > indifference to elect candidates? > Because it's plausible that voters would rank a candidate they dislike over a candidate they dislike even more. The B>C voters might really prefer B>>C>A (for example, B (100) > C (25) > A (0)). But clearly, they should cast a B>C vote to keep A from getting elected. > Note that WV doesn't actually do the former; it just doesn't violate > criteria (or offend electorates) that do. It looks safer in that respect. > If you take this election: > > 7 B>C > 5 C > 8 A > > And happened to know that the C and A voters *aren't* trying to use > margins' auto-randomize feature, and were simply trying to express that > they don't like the unranked candidates, then you wouldn't want to elect B. > > Now what is lost in the reverse situation (i.e. our voters are > margins-inclined) if you elect C? Are A voters really going to throw a fit > that their unspecified indifference didn't assist B? > > Kevin Venzke > > > > _____________________________________________________________________________ > Ne gardez plus qu'une seule adresse mail ! Copiez vos mails vers Yahoo! Mail > http://mail.yahoo.fr > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
