On Mar 29, 2008, at 23:35 , Michael Rouse wrote: > has > someone proposed a method to convert Range votes to maximal strategy > Approval votes? I was just wondering what the properties of such a > system might be (including cool-looking graphs, if available), and any > paradoxes or problems that might arise. > > For example, would it be possible to convert Range ballots into the > equivalent of Approval ballots where every voter has the equivalent of > perfectly accurate polling data?
It may be possible to create some interesting algorithms. The first problem to solve is that the optimal strategy is not stable since the best strategy of one voter depends on the decisions of other voters. That means that you maybe need to force the voters to use some strategy that is equally good for all but not optimal. > Are there weird > Approval cycles -- like you have with Condorcet "rock-paper-scissors" > ties -- or areas where the strategy is indeterminate? Yes. The opinion cycles are not really Condorcet specific but they occur in the preferences of a group irrespective of the election method. Condorcet just records them and then tries to make decisions including also the cyclic preferences in the decision making process. If you record the opinions of the voters using Range style ballots you will record the cycles too. (Also normal Approval has this problem. If the preferences are A>B>C>A then the applied strategy (who approves whom) determines the winner. It is just that the voters themselves have to guess and decide on the election day what might be the best strategy for them.) Juho ___________________________________________________________ All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info